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Abstract
Since the early days of research in algorithms and complexity, the computation of stable
matchings is a core topic. While in the classic setting the goal is to match up two agents
(either from different “gender” (this is Stable Marriage) or “unrestricted” (this is Sta-
ble Roommates)), Knuth [1976] triggered the study of three- or multidimensional cases.
Here, we focus on the study of Multidimensional Stable Roommates, known to be
NP-hard since the early 1990’s. Many NP-hardness results, however, rely on very general
input instances that do not occur in at least some of the specific application scenarios. With
the quest for identifying islands of tractability, we look at the case of master lists. Here, as
natural in applications where agents express their preferences based on “objective” scores,
one roughly speaking assumes that all agent preferences are “derived from” a central mas-
ter list, implying that the individual agent preferences shall be similar. Master lists have
been frequently studied in the two-dimensional (classic) stable matching case, but seemingly
almost never for the multidimensional case. This work, also relying on methods from pa-
rameterized algorithm design and complexity analysis, performs a first systematic study of
Multidimensional Stable Roommates under the assumption of master lists.
1 Introduction
Computing stable matchings is a core topic in the intersection of algorithm design, algorithmic
game theory, and computational social choice. It has numerous applications such as higher
education admission in several countries [2, 5], kidney exchange [32], assignment of dormito-
ries [29], P2P-networks [14], and wireless three-sided networks [7]. The research started in the
1960’s with the seminal work of Gale and Shapley [15], introducing the Stable Marriage
problem: given two different types of agents, called “men” and “women”, each agent of one
gender has preferences (i.e., linear orders aka rankings) over the agents of the opposite gender.
Then, the task is to find a matching which is stable. Informally, a matching is stable if no
pair of agents can improve by breaking up with their currently assigned partners and instead
matching to each other.
Many variations of this problem have been studied; Stable Roommates, with only one
type of agents, is among the most prominent ones. Knuth [23] asked for generalizing Stable
Marriage to dimension three, i.e., having three types of agents and having to match the agents
to groups of size three, where any such group contains exactly one agent of each type. Here,
∗Main work done while all authors were with TU Berlin.
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a matching is called stable if there is no group of three agents which would improve by being
matched together. We focus on theMultidimensional Stable Roommates Problem. Here
again, there is only one type of agents, now having preferences over (d − 1)-sets (that is, sets
of size d− 1) of (the other) agents. As this problem is NP-hard in general [26], we focus on the
case where the preferences of all agents are derived from a master list. For instance, master
lists naturally arise when the agent preferences are based on scores, e.g., when assigning junior
doctors to medical posts in the UK [19] or when allocating students to dormitories [29]. Master
lists have been frequently used in the context of (two-dimensional) stable matchings [3, 19,
27, 29] or the related Popular Matching problem [22]. We generalize master lists to the
multidimensional setting in two natural ways. First, following the above spirit of preference
orders, we assume that the master list consists of sets of size d − 1. Each agent then derives
its preferences from the master list by just deleting all (d − 1)-sets containing the agent itself.
Second, the master list orders all agents. In this case, any agent a shall prefer a (d − 1)-set t
over a (d − 1)-set t′ if t is “better” than t′ according to the master list, where “better” means
that a does not prefer the kth best agent of t′ over the kth best agent from t (according to the
master list). For any tuples t, t′ for which neither t is “better” than t′ nor t′ is “better” than t,
an agent may prefer t over t′ or t′ over t independently of the other agents. More formally, we
require that any agent prefers a set of d− 1 agents t over any set of d− 1 agents t′ dominated
by {a1, . . . , ad−1}, where we say that t = {a1, . . . , ad−1} dominates t′ = {b1, . . . , bd−1} if the
master list does not prefer bi over ai for all i ∈ [d− 1]. The agent preferences of any agent must
then fulfill for any two sets {a1, . . . , ad−1} and {b1, . . . , bd−1} of d − 1 agents with bi not being
before ai that in the master list the set {b1, . . . , bd−1} is not before {a1, . . . , ad−1}. In this case,
we also relax the condition that the master list is a strict order by the condition that the master
list is a partially ordered set (poset), and consider the parameterized complexity with respect
to parameters measuring the similarity to a strict order. Preferences where such a parameter
is small might arise if there are few similar rankings, and each agent derives its ranking from
these orders, or if the objective score consists of several attributes and each agent weights these
attributes slightly differently. Two agents are then incomparable in the master poset if they are
ranked in different order by some agents.
Related work. Stable Roommates can be solved in linear time [18]. If the preferences
are incomplete and derived from a master list, then both Stable Marriage and Stable
Roommates admit a unique stable matching [19]. If the preferences are complete but contain
ties, then finding a weakly stable matching in a Stable Roommates instance becomes NP-
hard [31]. However, if the preferences are complete and derived from a master list, then one
can decide whether an edge of a Stable Marriage instance is contained in a stable matching
in linear time [19], and a stable matching in a Stable Roommates instance always exists and
can be found in linear time. For incomplete preferences with ties derived from a master list, an
O(
√
nm)-time algorithm for finding a strongly stable matching is known [27] (where n is the
number of agents and m is the number of acceptable pairs), while for general preferences, only
an O(nm)-time algorithm is known [24].
Several Stable Marriage problems become easier for complete preferences derived from
a master list [34, Chapter 8]. Stable Roommates, however, is NP-hard if the preferences
contain ties, are incomplete, and are derived from a master list [19]. There is quite some work
for 3-Dimensional Stable Marriage [8, 28, 36, 37], but less so for 3-Dimensional Stable
Roommates.
While master lists are a standard setting for finding 2-dimensional stable matchings [3, 19,
21, 27, 29], we are only aware of few works combining multidimensional stable matchings with
master lists. Escamocher and O’Sullivan [13] gave a recursive formula for the number of 3-
dimensional stable matchings for cyclic preferences (i.e., the agents are partitioned into three
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sets V1, V2, and V3, and each agent from Vi only cares about the agent from Vi+1 it is matched
to) derived from master lists. Cui and Jia [7] showed that if the preferences are cyclic and
the preferences of the agents from V1 are derived from a master list, while each agent from
V3 is indifferent between all agents from V1, then a stable matching always exists and can be
found in polynomial time, but it is NP-complete to find a maximum-cardinality stable matching.
There is some work on d-dimensional stable matchings and cyclic preferences (without master
lists) [17, 25].
Deineko and Woeginger [10] showed that 3-Dimensional Stable Roommates is NP-
complete for preferences derived from a metric space. For the special case of the Euclidean plane,
Arkin et al. [1] showed that a stable matching does not always exist, but left the complexity of
deciding existence open.
Iwama et al. [20] introduced the NP-hard Stable Roommates with Triple Rooms,
where each agent has preferences over all other agents, and prefers a 2-set p of agents over
a 2-set p′ if it prefers the best-ranked agent of p over the best-ranked agent of p′, and the
second-best agent of p over the second-best agent of p′.
Our scenario of Multidimensional Stable Roommates can be seen as a special case of
finding core-stable outcomes for hedonic games where each agent prefers size-d coalitions over
singleton-coalitions which are then preferred over all other coalitions [33, 35]. Notably, there
are fixed-parameter tractability results for hedonic games (without fixed “coalition” size as we
request) wrt. treewidth (MSO-based) [16, 30]. Other research considers hedonic games with
fixed coalition size [6], but aims for Pareto optimal outcomes instead of core stability which we
consider.
To the best of our knowledge, the parameterized complexity of multidimensional stable
matching problems has not yet been investigated.
Our contributions. For an overview of our results, we refer to Table 1. To our surprise,
even if the preferences are derived from a master list of 2-sets of agents (in this case, dimension
d = 3), a stable matching is not guaranteed to exist (Section 3). We use such an instance not
admitting a stable matching to show that Three-Dimensional Stable Roommates is NP-
complete also when restricted to preferences derived from a master list of 2-sets (Theorem 3.2).
If the preferences are derived from a strict master list of agents, then a unique stable match-
ing always exists and can be found by a straightforward algorithm (Proposition 4.1). When
relaxing the condition that the master list is strict to being a poset, then the problem clearly
is NP-complete, as a master list which ties all agents does not impose any condition on the
preferences of the agents, and Three-Dimensional Stable Roommates is NP-complete.
Consequently, in the spirit of “distance from tractability”-parameterization, we investigate the
parameterized complexity with respect to several parameters measuring the distance of the
poset to a strict order. For the parameter maximum number of agents incomparable to a single
agent, we show that Multidimensional Stable Roommates is fixed-parameter tractable
(FPT)1 (even when d is part of the input) (Theorem 4.6). If this parameter is bounded, then
this results in one of the rare special cases of 3-dimensional stable matching problems which can
be solved by an “efficient” nontrivial algorithm. Considering the stronger parameter width of
the master poset, we show Three-dimensional Stable Roommates to be W[1]-hard2, and
this is true also for the orthogonal parameter deletion (of agents) distance to a linear master list
(Theorem 4.9). We also show that Multidimensional Stable Roommates is NP-complete
even with a linear order of the agents as a master list if each agent is allowed to declare an
1
FPT with respect to a parameter k means that the problem can be solved in f(k) poly(|I|) time, where f is
an arbitrary computable function and |I| denotes the size of the input instance.
2Informally, W[1]-hardness with respect to a specific parameter indicates that it is very unlikely to show
fixed-parameter tractability.
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Table 1: Results overview: six variations of Multidimensional Stable Roommates.
Setting/Parameter Complexity
Master list of 2-sets NP-complete for d = 3 (Theorem 3.2)
Strict master list of agents linear time (Proposition 4.1)
κ (max. # of incomparable agents) O(n2) + (κ2212κ)O(κ
2212κ)n (Theorem 4.6)
Width of poset W[1]-hard for d = 3 (Theorem 4.7)
Incomplete preferences, strict master list NP-complete for d ≥ 3 (Theorem 4.8)
Deletion distance to strict master list W[1]-hard for d = 3 (Theorem 4.9)
arbitrary set of 2-sets unacceptable (Theorem 4.8).
Proofs omitted due to space restrictions are marked by a star (⋆) and can be found in the
appendix.
2 Preliminaries
Let [n] := {1, 2, 3, . . . , n} and [n,m] := {n, n + 1, . . . ,m}. For a set X and an integer d, we
denote by
(
X
d
)
the set of size-d subsets of X. A preference list ≻ over a set X is a strict order
of X. We call a set of pairwise disjoint d-subsets of V a d-dimensional matching. If it is clear
from the context that it is a d-dimensional matching, then we may only write matching. We
say that an agent v prefers a (d − 1)-set A over a (d − 1)-set B if A ≻v B where ≻v is the
preference list of v. Any agent prefers any (d−1)-set not containing itself over being unmatched.
A blocking d-set for a d-dimensional matching M is a set of d agents {v1, v2, . . . , vd} such that
for all i ∈ [d], either vi is unmatched in M or {v1, v2, . . . , vd} \ {vi} ≻vi {wi1, wi2, . . . , wid−1},
where {wij : j ∈ [d− 1]} ∪ {vi} ∈M . A matching is called stable if it does not admit a blocking
d-set.
Input: An integer d, a set V of agents together with a preference list ≻v over
(
V \{v}
d−1
)
for each agent v ∈ V .
Task: Decide whether a stable matching exists.
Multidimensional Stable Roommates (MDSR)
Note that we require each agent to list each size-(d − 1) set of other agents. We denote by
ℓ-DSR the restriction of MDSR to instances with d = ℓ. We set n := |V |. A 3-dimensional
stable matching does not always exist, and 3-DSR is NP-complete [26].
A master list ML is a preference list over
(
V
d−1
)
. A preference list ≻v for an agent v is derived
from a master list ML by deleting all (d− 1)-sets containing v.
Example 1. Let V = {v1, v2, v3, v4} be a set of agents, d = 3, and let {v1, v2} ≻ {v2, v4} ≻
{v1, v3} ≻ {v3, v4} ≻ {v2, v3} ≻ {v1, v4} be the master list.
Then the preferences of v1 are {v2, v4} ≻v1 {v3, v4} ≻v1 {v2, v3}, the preferences of v2 are
{v1, v3} ≻v2 {v3, v4} ≻v2 {v1, v4}, the preferences of v3 are {v1, v2} ≻v3 {v2, v4} ≻v3 {v1, v4},
and the preferences of v4 are {v1, v2} ≻v4 {v1, v3} ≻v4 {v2, v3}.
We now define the Multidimensional Stable Roommates with Master List of (d−
1)-Sets problem (MDSR-ML-Sets).
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Input: An integer d, a set V of agents, and a master list ≻ML over
(
V
d−1
)
, from which
the preference list of each agent is derived.
Task: Decide whether a stable matching exists.
MDSR-ML-Sets
Again, we denote by ℓ-DSR-ML-Sets the problemMDSR-ML-Sets restricted to instances
with d = ℓ.
We now turn to the case that the master list orders single agents instead of (d − 1)-sets of
agents. We first need the definition of a partially ordered set.
A partially ordered set (poset) is a pair (V,), where  is a binary relation over the set V
such that (i) v  v for all v ∈ V , (ii) v  w and w  v if and only if v = w, and (iii) if u  v
and v  w, then u  w.
If v  w and v 6= w, then we write v ≻ w. If neither v  w nor w  v, then we say that v
and w are incomparable, and write v ∼ w. Instead of v  w or v ≻ w, we may also write w  v
or w ≺ v.
A chain is a subset X = {x1, x2, . . . , xk} ⊆ V such that xi ≻ xi+1 for all i ∈ [k − 1]. An
antichain is a subset X ⊆ V such that for all v,w ∈ X with v 6= w, we have v ∼ w. The width
of a poset is the size of a maximum antichain.
For a poset ≻ over a set V , we define κ≻(v) := |{w ∈ V : v ∼ w}| to be the number of
elements incomparable with v. We define κ(≻) := maxv∈V κ≻(v).
Note that if G¯≻ is the incomparability graph of the poset (V,≻) (i.e., the graph whose
vertex set is the set V , and there is an edge between v,w ∈ V if and only if v ∼ w), then
∆(G¯≻) = κ(≻), where ∆(G¯≻) is the maximum degree of a vertex in G¯≻. If ≻ is a weak order
(i.e., a linear order with ties), the parameter κ(≻) is equal to the maximum size of a tie.
Dilworth’s Theorem [11] states that the width of a poset is the minimum number of chains
such that each element of the poset is contained in one of these chains.
Having defined posets, we now show the connection to Multidimensional Stable Room-
mates by defining preferences derived from a poset of agents.
Defintion 1. Given a set of agents V , a poset (V,≻ML) (which we call the master poset),
and an integer d, we say that a preference list ≻v on
(
V \{v}
d−1
)
is derived from ≻ML if whenever
a1, . . . , ad−1 and b1, . . . , bd−1 with ai ML bi for all i ∈ [d − 1], then we have {a1, . . . , ad−1} v
{b1, . . . , bd−1}.
Example 2. Let v1 ≻ v2 ≻ v3 ≻ v4 ≻ v5 be a master poset. Then v1 has one of the
two preferences : {v2, v3} ≻v1 {v2, v4} ≻v1 {v2, v5} ≻v1 {v3, v4} ≻v1 {v3, v5} ≻v1 {v4, v5} or
{v2, v3} ≻v1 {v2, v4} ≻v1 {v3, v4} ≻v1 {v2, v5} ≻v1 {v3, v5} ≻v1 {v4, v5}.
For the master poset v2 ≻ v3 ∼ v4 ≻ v1, agent v1 has one of the following preferences :
{v2, v3} ≻v1 {v2, v4} ≻v1 {v3, v4} or {v2, v4} ≻v1 {v2, v3} ≻v1 {v3, v4}.
We are now ready to formally define MDSR-Poset.
Input: An MDSR instance I = (V, (≻v)v∈V , d) and a master poset ML such that the
preferences ≻v of each agent v are derived from ML.
Task: Decide whether there exists a stable matching in I.
MDSR-Poset
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Table 2: A blocking 3-set for each matching in instance Iinstable from Observation 3.1.
Matching Blocking 3-set
{a, b, c}, {d, e, f} {a, d, e}
{a, b, d}, {c, e, f} {a, c, e}
{a, b, e}, {c, d, f} {b, c, d}
{a, b, f}, {c, d, e} {a, c, d}
{a, c, d}, {b, e, f} {a, b, e}
Matching Blocking 3-set
{a, c, e}, {b, d, f} {a, b, e}
{a, c, f}, {b, d, e} {a, b, e}
{a, d, e}, {b, c, f} {a, b, e}
{a, d, f}, {b, c, e} {a, b, e}
{a, e, f}, {b, c, d} {a, c, d}
3 Three-Dimensional Stable Roommates with Master List of
2-sets
In this section, we consider the case that the preferences are complete and derived from a
master list of (d− 1)-sets. First, we give a small instance with six agents not admitting a stable
matching, and use this to show that already for d = 3 and preferences derived from a master
list of 2-sets, deciding whether an instance admits a stable matching is NP-complete.
We first present a 3DSR-ML-Sets instance Iinstable with six agents not admitting a stable
matching, showing that stable matchings do not have to exist even in the presence of master
lists.
The instance Iinstable has six agents a, b, c, d, e, and f . The master list is: {a, b} ≻ {a, c} ≻
{a, d} ≻ {a, f} ≻ {b, e} ≻ {c, d} ≻ {a, e} ≻ {b, f} ≻ {c, e} ≻ {b, d} ≻ {d, e} ≻ {b, c} ≻ {c, f} ≻
{d, f} ≻ {e, f}.
Observation 3.1. The instance Iinstable does not admit a stable matching.
Proof. Table 2 presents for each of the
(63)
2 = 10 matchings a blocking 3-set.
Using the instance Iinstable, we show NP-completeness of 3DSR-ML-Sets, reducing 1-in-3
Positive 3-Occurrence-SAT.
Note that MDSR is in NP as the size of the input is Θ(
(
n
d−1
)
), where n is the number of
agents, as the master preference list contains
(
n
d−1
)
sets of size d− 1, and, thus, stability can be
checked in polynomial time in the input by just checking for each d-set whether it is blocking.
We arrive at the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2 (⋆). 3-DSR-ML is NP-complete.
4 Master Lists of Agents
We now consider the case when there does not exist a master list of (d − 1)-sets of agents,
but a master list ≻ML of single agents. Each agent can derive its preferences from this master
list, meaning that if for two (d − 1)-sets t and t′, one can find a bijection σ from the elements
of t to the elements of t′ such that v ML σ(v) for all v ∈ t, then any agent (not occurring
in t or t′) shall prefer t over t′. If the master list is an arbitrary poset, then MDSR-Poset
clearly is NP-complete, as the preferences of any instance of 3-DSR are derived from the poset
in which no two different agents are comparable, and 3-Dimensional Stable Matching is
NP-complete. We show that this problem is polynomial-time solvable if the master list is a
strict order. Afterwards, we generalize this result by showing fixed-parameter tractability for
the parameter κ, the “maximum number of agents incomparable to a single agent”. On the
contrary, for the stronger parameter width of the poset, we show W[1]-hardness, leaving open
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whether it can be solved in polynomial time for constant width (in parameterized complexity
known as the question for containment in XP).
4.1 Strict Orders
We first consider the case that the master list is a strict order. In this case, an easy algorithm
solves the problem: Just match the first d agents from the master list together, delete them,
and recurse. Note that the preferences of any agent cannot be directly derived from the master
list, as e.g. an agent may prefer either {v1, v4} over {v2, v3} or {v2, v3} over {v1, v4}. Thus, the
input contains the complete preferences of all agents, and the input size is Θ(d
(
n
d−1
)
). Hence,
the running time subsequent algorithm is sublinear.
Proposition 4.1 (⋆). If ML is a strict order, then any MDSR-Poset instance admits a
unique stable matching that can be found in O(n) time.
4.2 Posets
In two-dimensional stable (or popular) matching problems with master lists, the master list
usually contains ties [3, 19, 22, 27, 29]. We allow the master list not only to contain ties, but to
be an arbitrary poset. In this case, the problem clearly is NP-complete, as the poset where each
agent is incomparable to each other agent does not pose any restrictions on the preferences of
the agents. Therefore, we consider several parameters measuring the similarity of the poset to
a strict order. For the parameter “maximum number of agents incomparable to a single agent”,
we show fixed-parameter tractability, and for the stronger parameter width of the poset, we
show W[1]-hardness.
4.2.1 Maximum Number of Agents Incomparable to a Single Agent
In this section, we show that MDSR-Poset is fixed-parameter tractable when parameterized
by κ(≻ML). As a first step of the algorithm, we show how to derive a strict order from the given
poset, which guarantees that for any two elements v and w with v being “much earlier” in the
strict order than w, we have that v ≻ML w.
Lemma 4.2 (⋆). For any poset (V,), there is an order v1, v2, . . . , vn of V such that (i) for
all i < j, we have that vi ≻ vj or vi ∼ vj , and (ii) for all j > i + 2κ(), we have vi ≻ vj .
Moreover, such an order can be found in O(|V |2) time.
For the rest of Section 4.2.1, we fix an instance I = (V, (v)v∈V ,ML) of MDSR-Poset, and
an order V = {v1, . . . , vn} of V fulfilling the conditions of Lemma 4.2 for the poset (V,ML). We
set κ := κ(ML). Furthermore, we denote by V ≤i = {v1, . . . , vi}, by V [i,j] = {vi, vi+1, . . . , vj},
and by V ≥i = {vi, vi+1, . . . , vn}.
We now show that the agents contained in a d-set of a stable matching are close to each
other in the strict order derived from the master poset by Lemma 4.2.
Lemma 4.3. Let I = (V, (v)v∈V ,ML) be an MDSR-Poset-instance and let V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}
such that this order fulfills Lemma 4.2 for the poset (V,ML).
For any stable matching M and any d-set {vi1 , vi2 , . . . , vid} ∈M with i1 < i2 < · · · < id, we
have that ij+1 − ij ≤ 2κd2 + 4κ+ 3d+ 1 for all j ∈ [d− 1].
Proof. Let M be a stable matching, and {vi1 , vi2 , . . . , vid} ∈M be a d-set contained in M . We
assume i1 < i2 < · · · < id, and fix some j ∈ [d− 1].
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Let T + be the set of d-sets inM containing an agent from V [ij+2κ+1,ij+1−2κ−1], and an agent
from V ≥ij+1−2κ, and let T − be the set of d-sets inM containing an agent from V [ij+2κ+1,ij+1−2κ−1],
and an agent from V ≤ij+2κ. We now give an example for the definitions of T + and T −.
Example 3. Let d = 4, κ = 5, and M be a stable matching. Assume that M contains the 4-set
{v3, v14, v50, v157}. Thus, it holds that i1 = 3, i2 = 14, i3 = 50, and i4 = 157. Taking j = 3
as an example, the set T + contains all 4-sets containing an agent from {v61, v62, . . . , v146}, an
agent from {v147, v148, . . . , vn}, and two more arbitrary agents. The set T − contains all 4-sets
containing an agent from {v1, v2, . . . , v60}, an agent from {v61, v62, . . . , v146}, and two more
arbitrary agents.
Let t be a d-set from T +. We claim that for every d-set t′ ∈ T + other than t, there exist
agents a ∈ t and a′ ∈ t′ with a ∼ML a′. Assume that there are two d-sets t and t′ such that there
do not exist a ∈ t and a′ ∈ t′ with a ∼ML a′. Let t∗ contain the d agents with minimum index
from t∪ t′. By the definition of T +, any d-set from T + contains an agent from V ≤ij+1−2κ−1 and
one agent from V ≥ij+1−2κ. Therefore, at least one agent of t∗ is contained in t, and at least one
agent is contained in t′. For any agent vp ∈ t \ t∗ and any vq ∈ t′ ∩ t∗, it holds by the definition
of t∗ that q < p. By Lemma 4.2, it follows that vq ≻ML vp or vq ∼ML vp. However, the latter
is not possible, since we assumed that there are no two agents a ∈ t and a′ ∈ t′ with a ∼ML a′.
Thus, we have that each a ∈ t prefers t∗ over t, and by symmetry, also each a′ ∈ t′ prefers t∗
over t′. It follows that the d-set t∗ is blocking, contradicting the assumption that M is stable.
As any agent is incomparable to at most κ other agents, it follows that |T +| ≤ κd + 1. By
analogous arguments, one can show that |T −| ≤ κd+ 1.
Any d-set s ∈ M consisting solely of agents from V [ij+2κ+1,ij+1−2κ−1] directly implies a
blocking d-set {vi1 , . . . , vij} ∪ Sd−j , where Sd−j contains d− j arbitrary agents from s.
It follows thatM contains at most 2(κd+1) sets containing an agent from V [ij+2κ+1,ij+1−2κ−1],
implying that (ij+1−2κ−1)−(ij+2κ+1) ≤ d ·2(κd+1)+d−1, where d−1 is added since there
can be at most d− 1 unmatched agents. It follows that ij+1 − ij ≤ 2κd2 + 4κ+ 3d+ 1.
We call a matching M local if for all t ∈ M and any two agents vj , vj′ ∈ t it holds that
|j− j′| ≤ (d− 1)(2κd2+4κ+3d+1). Note that any stable matching is local due to Lemma 4.3.
Using a dynamic program on the local matchings, we derive an FPT-algorithm for the combined
parameter κ+ d. This will lead to an FPT-algorithm for the parameter κ as we will later show
that if κ is much smaller than d, then a stable matching always exists.
Proposition 4.4 (⋆). MDSR-Poset can be solved in O(n2) + (κd4)O(κd
4)n time, where κ is
the maximum number of agents incomparable to a single agent, d is the dimension (i.e., the
group size), and n is the number of agents.
Sketch. We first apply Lemma 4.2 to the poset (V,ML) to get an order v1, . . . , vn of the agents
in O(n2) time. Let k := 2(d− 1)d(2κd2 + 4κ+ 3d+ 1).
We store an entry τ [i,M ] for each i ∈ [n] and each local matching M such that any d-set
t ∈M contains at least one agent of vi, . . . , vi+k. This entry shall be true if and only if M can
be extended to a local matching M∗ not admitting a blocking d-set consisting solely of agents
from v1, . . . , vi+k.
By Lemma 4.3, there exists a stable matching if and only if τ [n − k,M ] = true for some
local matching M . It remains to show how to compute these values.
For i = 1, we set τ [1,M ] := true if and only if M does not contain a blocking d-set inside
v1, . . . , vk+1. For i > 1, given a local matching Mi fulfilling that every d-set of Mi contains an
agent from vi, . . . , vi+k, we look up whether there exists a local matchingMi−1 of vi−1, . . . , vi+k−1
such that for any j ∈ [i, i + k − 1], we have Mi(vj) = Mi−1(vj), and such that Mi−1 ∪Mi does
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not admit a blocking d-set consisting of agents from vi−1, . . . , vi+k. If this is the case, then we
set τ [i,Mi] = true, and otherwise we set τ [i,Mi] = false.
Since there are at most kO(k) partitions of a k-elementary set [9], the table τ contains at
most nkO(k) entries. Each entry can be computed in kO(k) time, resulting in an overall running
time of kO(k)n = (κd3)O(κd
3)n.
We defer the correctness proof to the appendix.
We now extend Proposition 4.4 to an FPT-algorithm for the single parameter κ. To do so,
we show that if κ is much smaller than d, then there always exists a stable matching. Due to
space constraints, we only sketch the proof here.
Lemma 4.5 (⋆). If 4κ24κ ≤ d, then there exists a stable matching.
Sketch. Start with an empty matching M = ∅. Construct a d-set t∗ such that in any matching
containing t∗, no agent of t∗ can be contained in a blocking d-set. Add t∗ to M , delete the
agents from t∗ from the instance. Repeat this as long as there are at least d unmatched agents.
Construct t∗ as follows: For any agent a ∈ V ≤d−2κ and the first (d− 1)-set ta in its preferences,
it holds that {a}∪ta contains V ≤d−2κ and 2κ agents from V [d−2κ+1,d+2κ]. Since d≫ κ, it follows
that there exists a d-set t such that t = {a} ∪ ta for at least 4κ agents. We set t∗ := t.
Theorem 4.6. MDSR-Poset can be solved in O(n2)+ (κ5216κ)O(κ
5216κ)n time, where κ is the
maximum number of agents an agent is incomparable to, and n is the number of agents.
Proof. If 4κ24κ ≤ d, then we can safely answer yes by Lemma 4.5. Otherwise we have d ≤ 4κ24κ
and thus, Proposition 4.4 yields an algorithm running in h(κ)n time with h(κ) = f(κ, 4κ24κ)
where f(κ, d) = (κd4)O(κd
4).
In the natural generalization of Stable Marriage to dimension d, the set V of agents
is partitioned into d sets V 1, . . . , V d of agents, and each agent of V i has preferences over all
(d−1)-sets containing exactly one agent from V j for all j ∈ [d]\{i}. This problem is also fixed-
parameter tractable parameterized by κ+ d: The master list of agents can then be decomposed
into d master lists of agents, one for each set V i. Then, one can apply Lemma 4.2 to each of
these d master lists to get a strict order for the agents from V i = {vi1, . . . , vin}. Similarly to
Lemma 4.3, one can show that for any stable matching M and any d-set {v1i1 , . . . , vdid} (w.l.o.g.
we have ij ≤ ij+1), it holds that ij+1 ≤ ij + O(κd2). Now one can apply an algorithm similar
to Proposition 4.4 (sweeping over the sets V 1, . . . , V d from top to bottom, considering any
matching on k = f(κ, d) consecutive agents) to get an FPT-algorithm parameterized by κ+ d.
However, Lemma 4.5 does not seem to generalize to this case: for d = 3, there exists a small
instance with |V1| = |V2| = |V3| = 3 without a stable matching. “Cloning” the agents from
one of the sets, say V3, an arbitrary number of times will result in an instance of unbounded d
but κ = 3. It is therefore unclear whether Theorem 4.6 generalizes to the d-partite version of
MDSR-Poset.
Remark 1. Until now, we assumed that the input is encoded naively, i.e., for each agent, its
complete preference list is given as part of the input. However, this list is of length O(nd−1),
which would result in a total input size of O(nd). Thus, it may be more reasonable to assume
that the input is given by an oracle, which can answer queries about the preferences. In fact,
the FPT-algorithm parameterized by κ + d only needs one type of queries, namely given two
(d − 1)-sets t and t′ and an agent a, the oracle tells whether a prefers t over t′. Thus, our
FPT-algorithm parameterized only by κ also works when only using this query; however, in the
case that κ is much smaller than d, it cannot compute a stable matching, but only state its
existence. In order to also compute a stable matching efficiently, the algorithm would also need
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to be able to query what, given an agent a and a set X of agents, the first (d − 1)-set in a’s
preference list not containing an agent from X.
Having shown that MDSR-Poset is fixed-parameter tractable for the parameter κ, we turn
to a weaker parameter, the width of the master poset.
4.2.2 Width of the Poset
Reducing from Multicolored Independent Set, we show that MDSR-Poset is W[1]-hard
parameterized by the width of the poset.
Theorem 4.7 (⋆). MDSR-Poset is W[1]-hard parameterized by the poset width.
4.3 Incomplete Preferences Derived from a Strict Master List
Let MDSRI be the MDSR problem with incomplete preference lists, i.e., ≻v is not a total
order of
(
V \{v}
d−1
)
, but a total order of a subset Xv ⊆
(
V \{v}
d−1
)
for each v ∈ V . In this case, we
define a matching M to be a set of disjoint d-sets such that for all {v1, v2, . . . , vd} ∈ M , we
have {v1, v2, . . . , vd}\{vi} ∈ Xvi for all i ∈ [d]. Similarly, MDSRI-ML is the MDSRI problem
restricted to instances where the preferences are derived from a master list, and ℓ-DSRI is
MDSRI for the special case d = ℓ. We refer to the appendix for formal problem definitions.
In this section, we show that 3-DSRI-ML, the restriction of MDSRI-ML to d = 3, is
NP-complete, even if the master list is strict. In order to do so, we reduce from Perfect-
SMTI-ML. The input of this problem is an instance of Maximum Stable Marriage with
Ties and Incomplete Preferences such that the preferences of the women are derived
from a strict master list, while the preference list of men is derived from a master list which
may contain ties of size two. The problem asks whether there exists a perfect weakly stable
matching. Perfect-SMTI-ML is known to be NP-complete [19].
Theorem 4.8 (⋆). 3-DSRI-ML is NP-complete, even if the master list is derived from a master
list of agents.
Theorem 4.8 also shows NP-completeness for the tripartite version of 3-DSRI-ML. By
“cloning” each agent corresponding to a man d− 3 times (and for each “acceptable 3-set”, add
the cloned men to this 3-set, and add all d−1-subsets of the resulting d-set at their corresponding
place in the preferences), one can derive NP-completeness of d-DSRI-ML for any fixed d ≥ 3.
4.4 Deletion Distance to a Strict Master List
We saw that MDSR-Poset is FPT for the maximum number of agents incomparable to a single
agent but is W[1]-hard parameterized by the width of the poset. We now consider another
parameter measuring the similarity to a strict order, namely the deletion distance to a strict
order, i.e., the minimum number of agents which need to be deleted such that the resulting
preferences are derived from a strict order. Note that this parameter is orthogonal to the two
parameters investigated before: If the master list is the weak order a1 ∼ML a2 ≻ML a3 ∼ML
a4 ≻ML a5 ∼ML a6 ≻ML · · · ≻ML an−1 ∼ML an, then κ(ML) = 2, while one has to delete n2
agents in order to arrive at a strict order. If the preferences of all but one agent are derived from
a strict order, and the last agent’s preferences are derived from the inverse of this strict order,
then the deletion distance is one while any master poset from which this preferences are derived
from is only a single tie and thus has width n. In this section, reducing from Multicolored
clique we show that MDSR-Poset is W[1]-hard parameterized by the deletion distance to a
strict master list.
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Theorem 4.9 (⋆). 3-DSR parameterized by λ(I) is W[1]-hard, where λ(I) denotes the mini-
mum number of agents such that the preferences of the instance arising through the deletion of
these agents are derived from a strict master list.
5 Conclusion
Being a fundamental problem within the field of stable matching and the analysis of hedonic
games, our work provides a seemingly first systematic study on the parameterized complexity
of Multidimensional Stable Roommates. Focusing on the concept of master lists with the
goal to identify efficiently solvable special cases, we could only report partial success. While
we have one main algorithmically positive result, namely fixed-parameter tractability for the
parameter “maximum number of agents incomparable to a single agent”, all other (single)
parameterizations led again to (often surprising) hardness results ( see Table 1).
As to challenges for future research, first, it remained open whether our fixed-parameter
tractability result mentioned above also transfers to the setting of Multidimensional Stable
Marriage. Second, further following the quest for identifying islands of tractability, the study
of further, perhaps also combined parameters might be a worth-while goal.
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A Missing Proofs of Section 3
Input: A boolean formula in conjunctive normal form, where each clause contains
exactly three pairwise different variables, and each variable appears exactly
three times and only non-negated in the formula.
Task: Decide whether there exists an assignment satisfying exactly one literal from
each clause.
1-in-3 Positive 3-Occurrence-SAT
The basic idea of the reduction is the following. For each clause Cj , we have two agents cj
and dj , and for each variable xi, we have three agents x
1
i , x
2
i , and x
3
i , one for each occurrence
of the variable. Additionally, there are six agents zk,ℓi for each literal of a clause. In any stable
matching the agents cj and dj are matched to an agent x
ℓ
i corresponding to a variable occurring
in this clause. Now consider a variable xi. If the agent x
k
i (corresponding to the k-th occurrence
of xi) is matched to a 2-set {cj , dj} (corresponding to the clause Cj) for all k ∈ [3], then a stable
matching can match {zk,1i , zk,2i , zk,3i } and {zk,4i , zk,5i , zk,6i }. If the agent xki (corresponding to
occurrences of this variable) is not matched to a 2-set {cj , dj} (corresponding to the clause Cj)
for all k ∈ [3], then we can match {xi1, xi2, xi3} and then again match {zk,1i , zk,2i , zk,3i } and
{zk,4i , zk,5i , zk,6i }. If however the agents xki are matched to a 2-set {cj , dj} for one or two values of
k, then an agent xji which is not matched to a 2-set {cj , dj} will together with zk,1i , zk,2i , zk,3i , zk,4i ,
and zk,5i form a subinstance of six agents which does not admit a stable matching, and, thus,
the resulting matching will not be stable.
Thus, any stable matching matches cj and dj to exactly one variable occurring in the clause
Cj, and for each variable xi, either all or none of the agents x
k
i are matched to such 2-sets {cj , dj}.
In other words, setting the variables xi such that x
k
i is matched to a 2-set {cj , dj} to 1 and all
other variables to 0, we get a solution of the 1-in-3 Positive 3-Occurrence-SAT instance
I from each stable matching.
“Inverting” this process (i.e., matching each clause to its true variable, and then matching
the variable gadgets as described above), allows to construct a stable matching from a solution
to the 1-in-3 Positive 3-Occurrence-SAT instance I.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.2
A.1.1 The reduction
Let x1, . . . , xn be the variables and C1, . . . , Cm the clauses of a 1-in-3 Positive 3-Occurrence-
SAT instance I. We construct a 3-DSR-ML instance I ′ = (V, (≻v)v∈V ) as follows.
For each clause Cj , we add two agents cj and dj to V . For the k-th occurrence (k ∈ [3]) of
a variable xi in a clause, we add an agent x
k
i . We refer to the agent corresponding to the ℓ-th
literal of clause Cj as y
ℓ
j. The k-th occurrence of xi is also the ℓ-th literal of a clause Cj, and
we will denote the agent xki also by y
ℓ
j, i.e., x
k
i = y
ℓ
i . For each agent x
k
i , we add six agents
zk,1i , . . . , z
k,6
i to V .
For each j ∈ [m], we define Aj to be the following part of the master list:
{cj , dj} ≻ {y1j , dj} ≻ {y3j , cj} ≻ {y2j , dj} ≻ {y2j , cj} ≻ {y3j , dj} ≻ {y1j , cj}.
For each agent xki , we define Bki to be the following part of the master list (note that (by
renaming xki to a, agent z
k,1
i to b, agent z
k,2
i to c, . . . , and z
k,5
i to f) this contains the instance
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Iinstable); this ensures that xik has to be matched to a 2-set which is before Bki in the master
list):
{xki , zk,1i } ≻ {xki , zk,2i } ≻ {xki , zk,3i } ≻ {xki , zk,5i } ≻ {zk,1i , zk,4i } ≻ {zk,2i , zk,3i }
≻ {xki , zk,4i } ≻ {zk,1i , zk,5i } ≻ {zk,2i , zk,4i } ≻ {zk,1i , zk,3i } ≻ {zk,3i , zk,4i }
≻ {zk,1i , zk,2i } ≻ {zk,2i , zk,5i } ≻ {zk,3i , zk,5i } ≻ {zk,4i , zk,5i } ≻ {xij , zk,6i }
≻ {zk,1i , zk,6i } ≻ {zk,2i , zk,6i } ≻ {zk,3i , zk,6i } ≻ {zk,4i , zk,6i } ≻ {zk,5i , zk,6i }.
Note that by renaming xki to a, agent z
k,1
i to b, agent z
k,2
i to c, agent z
k,3
i to d, agent z
k,4
i to
e, and agent zk,5i to f , one sees that the master list restricted to these six agents is identical to
Iinstable from Observation 3.1.
We extend this to a sublist Ci as follows:
{x1i , x2i } ≻ {x2i , x3i } ≻ {x1i , x3i } ≻ B1i ≻ B2i ≻ B3i .
The complete master list looks as follows.
A1 ≻ . . .Am ≻ C1 ≻ · · · ≻ Cn ≻ . . . , where rest is in arbitrary order.
We call the constructed 3-DSR-ML instance I ′.
A.1.2 Proof of the forward direction
We show how to construct a stable matching from a satisfying truth assignment.
Lemma A.1. Let f : {xi} → {1, 0} be a solution to the 1-in-3 Positive 3-Occurrence-SAT
instance I. Then I ′ admits a stable matching.
Proof. We construct a stable matching M as follows.
Denote by I := {i ∈ [n] : f(xi) = 1} the set of indices such that the corresponding variables
are set to 1 by f .
For each i ∈ I and k ∈ [3], let j(i, k) be the index of the clause containing the k-th occurrence
of xi. We add {xki , cj(i,k), dj(i,k)} to M . For all i ∈ [n] \ I, we add the 3-sets {x1i , x2i , x3i } to
the matching. Finally, for each 2-set (i, k) ∈ [n] × [3], we add the 3-sets {zk,1i , zk,2i , zk,3i } and
{zk,4i , zk,5i , zk,6i }.
It remains to show that the resulting matching is stable.
Claim 1. For all j ≤ m, neither cj nor dj is contained in a blocking 3-set.
Proof of Claim: We prove the claim by induction over j. For j = 0, there is nothing to
show, as there are no agents c0 or d0.
For the induction step, first note that we can ignore all 2-sets containing an agent cp or dp
for some p < j, as we already know that they are not contained in a blocking 3-set. Thus,
we consider the sublist ML′ of ML arising by deleting all such 2-sets. The first 2-set of ML′
is {cj , dj}. Let yℓj = xki such that {cj , dj , yℓj} ∈ M . The variable yℓj is not contained in any
blocking 3-set, as it is matched to the first 2-set of sublist ML′. If cj is contained in a blocking
3-set, then the blocking 3-set is {cj , ypj , dj} for some p < ℓ, as {ypj , dj} for p < ℓ are the only
2-sets cj prefers over {yℓj , dj}. However, dj does not prefer {ypj , cj} over {yℓj, cj}, and thus,
{cj , ypj , dj} is not a blocking 3-set. By symmetric arguments, dj also cannot be contained in a
blocking 3-set.
Claim 2. No agent xki or z
k,p
i for i ≤ n, k ∈ [3] and p ∈ [6] is part of a blocking 3-set.
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Proof of Claim: We prove the claim by induction over i. For i = 0 there is nothing to show.
Note that all 2-sets from
⋃
ℓ∈[m]Aℓ contain an agent of the form cℓ or dℓ, and thus, no
blocking 3-set contains a 2-set from
⋃
ℓ∈[m]Aℓ. Furthermore, by the induction hypothesis, no
2-set from Cq for q < i can be contained in a blocking 3-set. Thus, it is enough to consider the
sublist MLi arising through the deletion of Aj for all j ∈ [m] and Cq for q < i.
If xi is set to 1, then all agents x
k
i are matched better than any 2-set from MLi, and thus,
cannot be part of a blocking 3-set. Otherwise, all of x1i , x
2
i , and x
3
i are matched to the first
2-set not containing themselves in MLi, and thus not contained in a blocking 3-set.
Considering the sublist ML′i arising from MLi by deleting all 2-sets containing an agent x
k
i ,
one sees that the first 15 sets of two agents of this sublist only consider agents of zk,pi for p ∈ [6],
and all agents zk,pi are matched to one of these 15 sets of size two. Thus, any blocking 2-set
containing an agents zk,pi consists only of agents from {zk,qi : q ∈ [6]}. By enumerating all 20
such 3-sets one easily verifies that none of them is blocking.
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
A.1.3 Proof of the backward direction
Now we show how to construct a solution to I from a stable matching. First, we identify small
subinstances of I ′ not admitting a stable matching, implying that at least one vertex of these
subinstances must be matched outside the subinstance.
Lemma A.2. The subinstance of I ′, which arises through the deletion of all but the agents xki
and {zk,pi : p ∈ [6]} for a fixed i ∈ [n] and a fixed k ∈ [3] does not admit a stable matching.
Proof. This can be seen in the same way as Observation 3.1; note that all 2-sets containing zk,6i
appear on the end of the preference lists.
We now show that the two agents cj and dj created for the clause Cj have to be matched
to an agent corresponding to a literal in this clause; indeed, we will later see that this literal
satisfies the clause Cj in the constructed solution.
Lemma A.3. In any stable matching M , for each j ∈ [m], there exists an ℓ ∈ [3] such
that {cj , dj , yℓj} ∈M .
Proof. By induction over j.
Base case: If M does not contain a 2-set {c1, d1, yℓi}, then {c1, d1, yℓ1} is a blocking 2-set
for all ℓ ∈ [3].
Induction step: By the induction hypothesis, no agent cp or dp for p < j is matched
to cj , dj , or some y
ℓ
j . Hence, neither cj , dj nor y
ℓ
j is matched to a 2-set which comes before Aj
in the preference list. Thus, if the lemma does not hold, then {cj , dj , yℓj} is a blocking 3-set for
all ℓ ∈ [3], contradicting the stability of M .
Before proving the backward direction, we need the following structural statement about the
agents x1i , x
2
i , and x
3
i , essentially stating that if one of these agents is matched to a 2-set {cj , dj}
(corresponding to setting this literal to 1), then all three of them are.
Lemma A.4. Let M be any stable matching. Then for all i ∈ [n + 1] and all i∗ < i ei-
ther {x1i∗ , x2i∗ , x3i∗} ∈ M or for each k ∈ [3], there exists some j ∈ [m] such that {xki∗ , cj , dj}.
Furthermore, for each k ∈ [3], the matching M contains two 3-sets t1 and t2 with t1, t2 ⊆ {zk,pi∗ :
p ∈ [6]}.
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Proof. We prove the lemma by induction over i. For i = 1, there is nothing to show.
By the induction hypothesis, no agent xkq or z
k,p
q is matched to a 2-set containing an agent xrq
or zr,sq for q < i, and by Lemma A.3, no agent z
k,p
i is matched to a 2-set containing an agent cj
or dj .
Let I := {k : ∃j ∈ [m] s.t. {xki , cj , dj} ∈M}.
Case 1: I = [3].
Then M must match {zjki : k ∈ [6]} into two 3-sets for each j ∈ [3], as all 2-sets before Bki
contain an agent which is not matched to an agent zk,pi by M .
Case 2: I = ∅.
Then M contains {x1i , x2i , x3i }, as all 2-sets before Ci contain an agent which is not matched
to an agent xki in M . By the same argument as in Case 1, M contains two 3-sets t1 and t2 with
t1, t2 ⊂ {zk,pi : p ∈ [6]}.
Case 3: |I| ∈ {1, 2}.
We show that this case leads to a contradiction and therefore cannot occur.
Case 3 (a): No 3-set in M contains two agents of the form xki for k ∈ [3].
If there does not exist some j ∈ [m] such that {x1i , cj , dj} ∈ M , then the agents x1i , z1,1i ,
. . . , z1,5i have to be matched to two 3-sets, implying by Lemma A.2 that M contains a blocking
3-set inside x1i , z
1,1
i , . . . , z
1,5
i . Thus, x
1
i is matched to a clause, then M matches z
11
i , . . . , z
16
i
together to two 3-sets by the same argument as in Case 1.
We can conclude then by the same argument that x2i is matched to a 2-set {cj , dj} for
some j ∈ [m], and from this that x3i is matched to a 2-set {cj , dj} for some j ∈ [m], a contra-
diction.
Case 3 (b): There is a 3-set {xk1i , xk2i , z} ∈M with z /∈ {xki }.
Then xk1i prefers to be matched to the 2-set {z11i , z12i }. However, z11i and z12i also prefer to
be matched by {xk1i , z11i , z12i } (all 2-sets preferred over {xk1i , z11i } contain a vertex xjk with j < i
or a clause cj or dj). Thus, we have a blocking 3-set, contradicting the stability of M .
The backward direction now easily follows.
Lemma A.5. If there exists a stable matching M , then there is a satisfying truth assignment
for I.
Proof. Consider the assignment f : {xi} → {1, 0}, where f(xi) = 1 if and only if all xki are
matched to a 2-set of the form {cj , dj}.
Assume that f is not a solution to I.
Case 1: There is a clause Cj which is not satisfied by f .
By Lemma A.3, for each j ∈ [m], there exists some ℓ ∈ [3] such that {cj , dj , yℓj} ∈ M .
Let yℓj = x
k
i . By Lemma A.4, all three agents x
1
i , x
2
i , and x
3
i are matched to a 2-set {cp, dp},
and thus, the clause Cj is satisfied by f , a contradiction.
Case 2: There is a clause Cj which is satisfied by at least two variables xi and xi′ .
The matching M can only contain one 2-set containing cj or dj , and so without loss of
generality xki is not matched to {cj , dj , xki } for all k ∈ [3]. By Lemma A.3, literal xk
′
i contained in
Cj does not match to any 2-set {cq, dq} for q ∈ [m], and thus, we have f(xi) = 0, a contradiction.
Thus, f is a solution to I.
Finally, observe that 3-DSR-ML is in NP (the stability of a matching can be checked in
O(n3) by enumerating all 3-sets, where n is the number of agents).
The reduction described in Appendix A.1.1 can be performed in linear time. Thus, NP-
completeness follows directly from Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.5.
Thus, we have now proven the Theorem 3.2.
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B Missing Proofs of Section 4
B.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof. We number the agents in such a way that v1 ≻ML v2 ≻ML · · · ≻ML vn.
We claim that M := {{vd(i−1)+1, vd(i−1)+2, . . . , vdi} : 1 ≤ i ≤ ⌊nd ⌋} is a stable matching. As-
sume that there is a blocking d-set {vi1 , vi2 , . . . , vid} with i1 < i2 < · · · < id. Let {vi1 , w2, w3, . . . , wd−1} ∈
M be the d-set containing vi1 . Note that such a d-set exists as M leaves at most the d − 1
last agents of the master list unmatched, and the agents vij are after vi1 in the master list for
j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , d}. Thus, vi1 is matched, and cannot prefer {vi2 , . . . , vid} over M as wj ≻ML vij
for all j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , d}.
It remains to show that M is the unique stable matching. Assume that there is a stable
matching M ′ 6= M . Let i be the smallest index such that vi is matched in M ′, but to another
(d − 1)-set than in M . Since only the at most d − 1 agents with highest index are unmatched
in M , we get that vi is matched in M . Thus, we have that i = d(j − 1) + 1 for some j ∈ N.
We claim that T := {vi, vi+1, vi+2, . . . , vi+d−1} is a blocking d-set for M ′. By the definition
of i, no agent with index smaller than i is matched to one of the agents vi, vi+1, . . . , vi+d−1,
and we have that T /∈M . Thus, for any v ∈ T , matched to a (d− 1)-set T ′v in M ′, the bijection
σv : T \{v} → T ′v \{v} matching the agent with the jth-lowest index in T \{v} to the agent with
the jth-lowest index in T ′v \ {v} satisfies w ML σ(w) for all w ∈ T \ {v}. Since the preferences
are derived from ML, it follows that T is a blocking d-set.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 4.2
Proof. Let v1 ∈ V be an element such that v1  v or v1 ∼ v for all v ∈ V . Such an element v1
has to exist in any poset.
By induction, we can find such an order of V \ {v1}.
We now add v1 at the beginning. Let V
′ be the set of elements incomparable with v1. It
remains to show that the vertices from V ′ are among the 2κ() first vertices.
Note that there is no v′ ∈ V ′ and v ∈ V \ V ′ with v ≻ v′, as otherwise v1  v ≻ v′ and
thus v1 ≻ v′, but by the definition of V ′ we have v1 ∼ v′.
Thus, for any v′ ∈ V ′, there are at most |V ′|+κ≻(v′) ≤ 2κ() elements before v′, and thus,
the new order satisfies the lemma.
Since a maximal element in a poset can be found in linear time, the order can be found in
quadratic time.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 4.4
Proof. We first apply Lemma 4.2 to the poset (V,ML) to get an order v1, . . . , vn of the agents
in O(n2) time. Let k := 2d(d − 1)(2κd2 + 4κ+ 3d+ 1).
We will store an entry τ [i,M ] for each i ∈ [n] and each local matching M such that any
d-set t ∈ M contains at least one agent of vi, . . . , vi+k. This entry shall be true if and only if
M can be extended to a local matching M∗ not admitting a blocking d-set consisting solely of
agents from v1, . . . , vi+k.
By Lemma 4.3, there exists a stable matching if and only if τ [n − k,M ] = true for some
local matching M . Thus, it remains to show how to compute these values.
For i = 1, we set τ [1,M ] := true if and only if M does not contain a blocking d-set inside
v1, . . . , vk+1.
For i > 1, given a local matching Mi fulfilling that every d-set of Mi contains an agent from
vi, . . . , vi+k, we look up whether there exists a local matching Mi−1 of vi−1, . . . , vi+k−1 such
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that for any j ∈ [i, i + k − 1], we have Mi(vj) = Mi−1(vj), and such that Mi−1 ∪Mi does not
admit a blocking d-set consisting of agents from vi−1, . . . , vi+k. If this is the case, then we set
τ [i,Mi] = true, and otherwise we set τ [i,Mi] = false.
Each entry can be computed in kO(k) time, resulting in an overall running time of kO(k)n =
(κd3)O(κd
3)n.
It remains to show the correctness of this dynamic program, which we do by induction. For
i = 1, the values τ [i,M ] are computed correctly by definition. Let i > 1. First assume that
τ [i,Mi] = true. Let Mi−1 be the local matching with τ [i − 1,Mi−1] = true and Mi−1 ∪Mi not
admitting a blocking d-set consisting of agents from vi−1, . . . , vi−k. By the induction hypothesis,
τ [i − 1,Mi−1] was computed correctly, implying that there exists a local matching M∗i−1 on
v1, . . . , vi+k−1 such that for each j ∈ [i − 1, i + k − 1], we have Mi−1(vj) = M∗i−1(vj), and no
blocking d-set consists solely of agents from v1, . . . , vi+k−1. We defineM
∗
i :=M
∗
i−1∪Mi. Clearly,
it holds that Mi(vj) =M
∗
i (vj) for all j ∈ [i, i+k]. Next, we show that M∗i contains no blocking
d-set consisting solely of agents from V ≤k+i. Any such d-set t must contain vk+i, since M
∗
i−1
does not admit blocking d-sets consisting solely of agents from v1, . . . , vk+i−1. Furthermore, it
must contain at least one agent vj with j < i− 1 since we checked for all d-sets of agents from
vi−1, . . . , vi+k whether they are blocking. Since k − i > 2d(d − 1)2κd2 + 4κ+ 3d+ 1, it follows
that there exists some ℓ ∈ [i + (d − 1)2κd2 + 4κ + 3d + 1, k − (d − 1)2κd2 + 4κ + 3d + 1] such
that t contains no agent from V [ℓ−2κd
2+4κ+3d+1,ℓ+2κd2+4κ+3d+1], and there exists some t′ ∈ M∗i
with vℓ ∈ t′ (note that such an ℓ exists as there can be at most d− 1 unmatched agents). Then
the d agents with minimum index from t ∪ t′ form a blocking d-set.
Now assume that the dynamic program computed τ [i,Mi] to be false . We assume that the
correct value of τ [i,Mi] is true , and will reach a contradiction. Let M
∗
i be a local matching
witnessing that the correct value of τ [i,Mi] is true , i.e., we have M
∗
i (vj) = Mi(vj) for all
j ∈ [i, i+k], andM∗i does not admit a blocking d-set consisting solely of agents from v1, . . . , vi+k.
Let Mi−1 be the restriction of M
∗
i to the d-sets containing vi−1, . . . , vi+k−1. The matching M
∗
i
also witnesses that τ [i − 1,Mi−1] = 1, and this value is correctly computed by induction.
Extending Mi−1 with Mi(vi+k) does not lead to a blocking d-set containing only agents from
vi−1, . . . , vi+k, as M
∗
i does not contain such a blocking 3-set. It follows that the algorithm
computed τ [i,Mi] to be true , a contradiction.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 4.5
Proof. We apply Lemma 4.2 to the poset (V,ML), getting an order V = {v1, . . . , vn} of the
agents.
Claim 3. There exists a tuple t∗ such that for any matching containing t∗, no blocking d-set
contains an agent from t∗.
Proof of Claim: For each i ∈ [d− 2κ], let ti := {vi} ∪ t, where t is the first (d − 1)-tuple in
vi’s preferences. By Lemma 4.2, it holds that ti contains vj for each j ∈ [d− 2κ], and all agents
of ti are from V
≤d+2κ. Thus, there are at most
(2κ
4κ
) ≤ 24κ different classes. Since d ≥ 4κ24κ,
there exists a d-set t∗ with t∗ = ti for at least 4κ agents vi.
Consider any matching M containing t∗, and assume that there is a blocking d-set t con-
taining an agent a∗ ∈ t∗. Let t \ t∗ = {vi1 , . . . , vir} and t∗ \ t = {vj1 , . . . , vjr}. Note that for
p ∈ [4κ], it holds that jp ≤ (d − 2κ) − (4κ − p) < (d − 2κ + p) − 2κ ≤ ip − 2κ. For p > 4κ, it
holds that jp ≤ d+ 2κ < d+ 4κ+ 1− 2κ ≤ ip − 2κ. By Lemma 4.2 it follows that vjp ≻ML vip .
Thus, a∗ prefers t∗ over t, contradicting that t is a blocking d-set.
From the claim, the lemma follows easily: We start with an empty matching M = ∅ and as
long as there are at least d unmatched agents, we successively compute such a d-set t∗, add t∗
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to M , delete the agents from t∗, and repeat. The resulting matching is clearly stable, as the
agents from the d-sets added to M are not part of a blocking d-set.
B.5 Proof of Theorem 4.7
In this section, at some points it does not matter how the preferences between a set of 2-sets look,
as long as the preferences are derived from the poset (which will be described in Section B.5.4).
Thus, whenever we describe the preferences of an agent, and these preferences contain a set of
2-sets, then this means that the preferences of the agent arise through replacing this set by a
strict order of the elements of the set which is derived from the master list poset.
B.5.1 The reduction
We provide a parameterized reduction from Multicolored Independent Set.
Input: A k-partite graph G = (V 1 ∪˙ V 2 ∪˙ · · · ∪˙ V k, E) with |V i| = n for all i ∈ [k].
Task: Decide whether G contains an independent set I such that I ∩ V i 6= ∅ for all
i ∈ [k].
Multicolored Independent Set
Let V i = {vi1, . . . , vin}.
When describing the reduction, we only describe the beginning of the preferences of an
agent. The remaining acceptable 2-sets can be added in an arbitrary way obeying the master
poset.
“Cut-off” gadgets.
For each agent v (except for those belonging to cut-off gadgets), the reduction contains a
cut-off gadget. This gadget “cuts off” the preference list of agent v after a specific 2-set pv, and
enforces v to be matched to a 2-set p with p v pv.
Given an instance I of MDSR-Poset with master poset ≻ML, the cut-off gadget for an
agent v and a 2-set pv, denoted by COv, contains six agents z
1
v , . . . , z
6
v .
The preferences of the agents from the cut-off gadget look as follows (note that the prefer-
ences of zrv are very similar to those of z
k,r
i in the NP-hardness reduction of 3DSR-ML-Sets,
see Appendix A.1.1). The preferences of any agent zrv start with all 2-sets in
(
W
2
) ∪ (W × {zℓv :
ℓ ∈ [6]}), where W := {w, zℓw : w ≻ML v, ℓ ∈ [6]}, and are then followed by (ignoring all 2-sets
containing the agent itself):
{v, z1v} ≻ {v, z2v} ≻ {v, z3v} ≻ {v, z5v} ≻ {z1v , z4v} ≻ {z2v , z3v} ≻ {v, z4v} ≻ {z1v , z5v}
≻ {z2v , z4v} ≻ {z1v , z3v} ≻ {z3v , z4v} ≻ {z1v , z2v} ≻ {z2v , z5v} ≻ {z3v , z5v} ≻ {z4v , z5v}
≻ {v, z6v} ≻ {z1v , z6v} ≻ {z2v , z6v} ≻ {z3v , z6v} ≻ {z4v , z6v} ≻ {z5v , z6v}.
The preferences of agent v are modified as follows: After the 2-set p, we insert all 2-sets
containing agents from the cut-off gadget in the same order as in the above list. All agents w
with v ≻ML w add all 2-sets containing an agent from the cut-off gadget at the beginning of
their preference, while all other agents add all 2-sets containing an agent zrv at the end of their
preferences in an arbitrary order.
Lemma B.1. Let I0 be a MDSR-Poset-instance, and for each v ∈ V , let pv be a 2-set not
containing v. Let V = {v1, . . . , vn} with vi % vj for all i < j. Let Ik arise from I by adding for
i = 1, . . . , k a cut-off gadget for agent vi and 2-set pvi . Let Mk be the set of stable matchings
M in I0 with M(v) ≻v pv for all v ∈ {v1, . . . , vk}. For any matching M ∈ Mk, the matching
Mk :=M ∪ {{z1v , z2v , z3v}, {z4v , z5v , z6v} : v ∈ {v1, . . . , vk}} is stable in Ik. A matching M ′ in Ik is
stable if and only if M ′ ∩ (V3) is stable in I0.
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Proof. We prove the lemma by induction over k. For k = 0, there is nothing to show. Fix
k > 0.
First, we show that for any stable matchingM ∈ I0 withM(v) v pv for all v ∈ {v1, . . . , vk},
it holds that Mk :=M ∪ {{z1v , z2v , z3v}, {z4v , z5v , z6v} : v ∈ {v1, . . . , vk}} is a stable matching in Ik.
Let v := vk. No blocking 3-sets consists solely of agents from {zrv : r ∈ [6]}; this can be seen
by checking all 20 such 3-sets. Any blocking 3-set needs to contain at least one agent zrv (else
it would already be a blocking 3-set in Ik−1). Agent v is not part of such a blocking 3-set, as
it ranks all 2-sets containing an agent zrv after M(v). All other 2-sets preferred by the agent
zrv contain an agent v
′ or zqv′ with v
′ ≻ML v. However, v′ has to be matched, as else v′ ∪M(v)
would be a blocking 3-set. It follows that v′ and zqv′ do not prefer any 2-set containing z
r
v over
M(v′), and is thus not part of a blocking 3-set. Thus, the blocking 3-set has to be inside a
single cut-off gadget, a contradiction.
Vice versa, let Mk be a stable matching in Ik. Let M be the matching arising from Mk by
deleting all 3-sets containing an agent zrvi . We need to show thatM is stable andM(v) v p for
all v ∈ {v1, . . . , vk}. If M(v) v p does not hold for all v ∈ {v1, . . . , vk}, then let vi be the agent
of minimal index for which pv ≻M(vi). Then for all j < i, the matching M matches the agents
from {zrvj : r ∈ [6]} in two 3-sets. By a similar case distinction as in Lemma A.2, it follows that
there is a blocking 3-set in {vi} ∪ {zrvi : r ∈ [5]}, contradicting the stability of M . Assume that
M is not stable, and let t be a blocking 3-set. Then one agent of t has to be matched in Mk but
not in M , implying that t contains an agent from the cut-off gadgets, a contradiction.
Vertex-selection gadget.
A vertex-selection gadget has 6n agents aj (j ∈ [n]), bk (k ∈ [n]), ci, c¯i (i ∈ [n− 1]), dp, and
d¯p (p ∈ [n + 1]). The intuitive idea is the following. The agents ai and bi want to be matched
to 2-sets {ci, c¯j}. As ci prefers {aj , c¯i} over {bk, c¯i} while c¯i prefers {bk, ci} over {aj , ci}, we can
match the n−1 sets of size two of the form {ci, c¯i} to the agents {aj : j < v}∪{bk : k < n+1−v}
for any v ∈ V , corresponding to selecting the vertex v to be part of the independent set. The
agents {aj : j ≥ v} ∪ {bk : k ≥ n+ 1− v} are then matched to the 2-sets {di, d¯i}, and can form
blocking 3-sets with the edge gadget (which are described later).
Formally, the preferences look as follows.
aj , bk : {{cp, c¯q} : p, q ∈ [n− 1]} ≻ {{dp, d¯q} : p, q ∈ [n+ 1]} ≻ CO
ci : {{aj , c¯q} : j ∈ [n], q ∈ [n− 1]} ≻ {{bk, c¯q} : k ∈ [n], q ∈ [n− 1]} ≻ COci
c¯i : {{bk, cq} : k ∈ [n], q ∈ [n− 1]} ≻ {{aj , cq} : j ∈ [n], q ∈ [n− 1]} ≻ COc¯i
di : {{aj , d¯q} : j ∈ [n], q ∈ [n+ 1]} ≻ {{bk, d¯q} : k ∈ [n], q ∈ [n+ 1]} ≻ COdi
d¯i : {{bk, dq} : k ∈ [n], q ∈ [n− 1]} ≻ {{aj , dq} : j ∈ [n], q ∈ [n+ 1]} ≻ COd¯i
See Figure 1 for an example of the 3-sets before the cut-off gadgets.
Lemma B.2. Let I be a MDSR-Poset-instance arising from a vertex-selection gadget by
adding agents such that for every agent a in the vertex-selection gadget except from {ai, bi : i ∈
[3n′ + 1]}, the preferences of a all 2-sets consisting of two agents in the vertex-selection gadget
are preferred to a 2-set containing an agent outside the vertex-selection gadget.
For every stable matching M in I, there exists some i∗ ∈ [n] such that {ai, cj , c¯k} ∈ M for
all i < i∗, {ai, dj , d¯k} ∈ M for i ≥ i∗, {bi, cj , c¯k} ∈ M for i ≤ n − i∗, and {bi, dj , d¯k} ∈ M for
i > n− i∗.
Vice versa, for any i∗ ∈ [n], the matchingMi∗ = {{ai, ci, c¯n−i∗+i} : i < i∗}∪{{ai, di−i∗+1, d¯i+1} :
i ≥ i∗} ∪ {{bi, ci+i∗−1, c¯i} : i ≤ n − i∗} ∪ {{bi, di+1, d¯i−i∗−1} : i > n − i∗} contains no blocking
3-set solely consisting from agents in the vertex-selection gadget.
21
a1
a2
a3
b1
b2
b3
{c1, c¯1}
{c2, c¯2}
{d1, d¯1}
{d2, d¯2}
{d3, d¯3}
{d4, d¯4}
Figure 1: The acceptable 3-sets (i.e., 3-sets which are preferred over the cut-off gadget by all
agents they contain) of a vertex-selection gadget. For the sake of readability, we ignored 3-
sets containing the agents ci and c¯j or di and d¯j for i 6= j. Each edge corresponds to a 3-set
containing the one endpoint ai or bi and the two vertices contained in the circle of the other
endpoint of the edge. For example, the edge between a1 and {c1, c¯1} indicates that {a1, c1, c¯1}
is an acceptable 3-set.
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Proof. Consider any stable matching M . Due to the cut-off gadgets, any agent ci is matched
to a 2-set {aj , c¯p} or {bk, c¯p}, and any agent di is matched to a 2-set {aj , d¯p} or {bk, d¯p}. Since
|{ai, bi : i ∈ [n]}| = 2n = |{ci : i ∈ [n − 1]}| + |{di : i ∈ [n + 1]}|, we get that any agent ai
or bi is matched to a 2-set {cp, c¯q} or {dp, d¯q}. Assume that there exists some i ∈ [n] with
{ai, cp, c¯q} /∈ M but {ai+1, cr, c¯s} ∈ M (the case that there exists such bi is symmetric). Then
{ai, cr, c¯s} is a blocking 3-set. Thus, the first statement holds.
Let i∗ ∈ [n] and assume thatMi∗ contains a blocking 3-set inside the vertex-selection gadget.
Then this 3-set contains two agents cp and c¯q or dp and d¯q, and an agent ai or bi.
Case 1: t = {ai, cp, c¯q}. If i ≤ min{p, q + i∗ − n}, then ai does not prefer t over M . If
p ≤ min{i, q + i∗ − n}, then cp does not prefer t over M . If q ≤ min{i, p}+ n− i∗, then c¯q does
not prefer t over M .
Case 2: t = {ai, dp, d¯q}. If i ≤ min{p + i∗ − 1, q − 1}, then ai does not prefer t over M . If
p ≤ min{i, q − 1} − i∗ + 1, then dp does not prefer t over M . If q ≤ min{i, p+ i∗ − 1}+ 1, then
d¯q does not prefer t over M .
Case 3: t = {bi, cp, c¯q}. If i ≤ min{p − i∗ + 1, q}, then bi does not prefer t over M . If
p ≤ min{i, q}+ i∗ − 1, then cp does not prefer t over M . If q ≤ min{i, p− i∗ + 1}, then c¯q does
not prefer t over M .
Case 4: t = {bi, dp, d¯q}. If i ≤ min{p − 1, q + i∗ + 1}, then ai does not prefer t over M . If
p ≤ min{i, q + i∗ + 1}+ 1, then dp does not prefer t over M . If q ≤ min{i, p− 1} − i∗ − 1, then
d¯q does not prefer t over M .
In each of the four cases, we have a contradiction, finishing the proof of the lemma.
The reduction will create k such vertex-selection gadgets. We number these gadgets A1, . . . , Ak,
and refer to agent aj (respectively bj , cj , c¯j , dj , or d¯j) from the i-th vertex-selection gadget via
aij (respectively b
i
j, c
i
j , c¯
i
j , d
i
j , or d¯
i
j).
We say that a vertex-selection gadget Ai selects the vertex vii∗ if the matching inside the
vertex-selection gadget contains the 3-sets {{aij , cij , c¯ij} : j < i∗}.
Edge gadget.
Fix a pair of vertex-selection gadgets Ai and Aj , and let Ei,j := {{v,w} ∈ E(G) : v ∈
V i, w ∈ V j}. For each edge e = {viri , vjrj} in Ei,j, our reduction contains an edge gadget
between Ai and Aj , containing the 15 agents he,ia , h
e,i
b , h
e,j
a , h
e,j
b , g
e
1, g
e
2, g
e
3, g¯
e
1, g¯
e
2, g¯
e
3, f
e, f¯ e,
αe1, α
e
2, and α
e
3.
The intuitive function of the edge gadget is the following. By Lemma B.2, in any stable
matching there exists some i∗ such that Ai selects vii∗ , i.e., a
i
k is matched to {dp, d¯q} for all
k ≥ i∗, and thus prefers being matched to the edge gadget (more specifically, to the 2-set
{he,ia , αe1}). Similarly, bk for k > n − i∗ prefers to be matched to the edge gadget, namely to
the 2-set {he,ib , αe1}. The agent he,ia [he,ib ] prefers the 2-set {aii∗ , αe1} [{bin+1−i∗ , αe1}] over the 2-set
{f e, f¯ e} if ri ≤ i∗ [ri ≥ i∗]. Thus, if viri = vii∗ , i.e., if the vertex selected by Ai is an endpoint of
e, then both he,ia and h
e,i
b cannot be matched to {f e, f¯ e}. The edge gadget is now designed in
such a way that an arbitrary of these vertices he,yx (x ∈ {a, b} and y ∈ {i, j}) has to be matched
to {f e, f¯ e}, which is possible if and only if e is not an edge between the two vertices selected
by the vertex-selection gadgets, i.e., e 6= {vii∗ , vjj∗}.
We now give a formal description of the edge gadget. The preferences of the agents look as
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ai1
ai2
bi1
bi2
aj1
aj2
bj1
bj2d
e,i
b
de,ia
de,jb
de,ja
{g3, g¯1}
{g2, g¯2}
{g1, g¯3}
{f, f¯}
α1
{α2, α3}
Figure 2: The acceptable 3-sets (i.e., 3-sets which are preferred over the cut-off gadget by all
agents they contain) of the edge gadget for the edge {vi1, vj2}. Acceptable 3-sets are drawn in
two ways: If they contain one of the circles or the ellipse, then they consist of the two agents
inside the circle and the other endpoint of an edge incident to the cycle. Otherwise, they are
marked by the bold colored paths of length two; if a 2-set of agents is contained in two different
edges (all such 3-sets contain α1), then the corresponding edge is colored alternating in the two
colors.
follows.
he,ia : {{gep, g¯eq} : p, q ∈ [3]} ≻ {{aip, αe1} : p ≤ ri} ≻ {fe, f¯e} ≻ COhe,ia ,
he,ja : {{gep, g¯eq} : p, q ∈ [3]} ≻ {{ajp, αe1} : p ≤ rj} ≻ {fe, f¯e} ≻ COhe,ja ,
he,ib : {{gep, g¯eq} : p, q ∈ [3]} ≻ {{bip, αe1} : p < n+ 1− ri} ≻ {fe, f¯e2} ≻ COhe,ib ,
he,jb : {{gep, g¯eq} : p, q ∈ [3]} ≻ {{bjp, αe1} : p < n+ 1− rj} ≻ {fe, f¯e2} ≻ COhe,jb ,
ge
1/2/3 : {{he,ia , g¯ep} : p ∈ [3]} ≻ {{he,ib , g¯ep} : p ∈ [3]} ≻ {{he,ja , g¯ep} : p ∈ [3]} ≻ {{he,jb , g¯ep} : p ∈ [3]} ≻ COge1/2/3 ,
g¯e
1/2/3 : {{he,jb , gep} : p ∈ [3]} ≻ {{he,ja , gep} : p ∈ [3]} ≻ {{he,ib , gep} : p ∈ [3]} ≻ {{he,ja , gep} : p ∈ [3]} ≻ COg¯e1/2/3 ,
fe : {he,ia , f¯e} ≻ {he,ib , f¯e} ≻ {he,ja , f¯e} ≻ {he,jb , f¯e} ≻ COfe ,
f¯e : {he,jb , fe} ≻ {he,ja , fe} ≻ {he,ib , fe} ≻ {he,ja , fe} ≻ COf¯e ,
αe
1
: {{aip, he,ia }, {bip, he,ia }, {ajp, he,ja }, {bjp, he,ja } : p ∈ [n]} ≻ {αe2, αe3} ≻ COαe1 ,
αe
2
: {αe
1
, αe
3
} ≻ COαe
2
,
αe
3
: {αe
1
, αe
2
} ≻ COαe
3
.
See Figure 2 for the 3-sets which are before the cut-off gadget for all agents they contain.
Furthermore, we extend the preferences of aℓk by inserting the 2-set {he,ℓa , αe1} directly after
{cℓn−1, c¯ℓn−1}, and the preferences of bℓk by the 2-set {he,ℓb , α1} directly after {cℓn−1, c¯ℓn−1}.
Lemma B.3. If for a matching M and an edge e = {vir, vjs} the vertex-selection gadgets Ai and
Aj select the vertices vir and v
j
s, then this matching M contains a blocking 3-set.
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Vice versa, given a matching inside the vertex-selection gadgets such that for no edge, both
endpoints are selected by a vertex-selection gadget, this matching can be extended to the edge
gadget without introducing a blocking 3-set.
Proof. Let M be a matching such that Ai selects the vertex vir and A
j selects the vertex vjs,
and let e = {vir, vis}. We need to show that any extension M ′ of M to the edge gadget contains
a blocking 3-set.
By the cut-off gadgets for f e and f¯ e, we know that M ′ must contain a 2-set {he,kx , f e, f¯ e} for
some k ∈ {i, j} and x ∈ {a, b}. We assume k = i and x = a, the other cases are symmetric. We
claim that {air, he,ia , αe1} is a blocking 3-set. Agent air prefers {he,ia , αe1} over M(air) = {di1, d¯i1}.
Also agent he,ia prefers {air, αe1} over M ′(he,ia ) = {f e, f¯ e} as vir is an endpoint of e. Note that
agents he,kx are matched to {gep, g¯eq} for (k, x) 6= (i, a) due to the cut-off gadgets for gep. Thus,
we have M ′(αe1) = {αe2, αe3}, and therefore, αe1 prefers }air, de,ia } over M ′.
To see the second part of the lemma, let M be a matching such that the vertices selected by
the vertex selection gadgets are vii∗ and v
j
j∗ . Let the edge gadget correspond to the edge {vir, vjs}.
We assume that r < i∗ (i∗ > r is symmetric by switching the roles of a and b), and s ≤ j∗
(again s ≥ j∗ is symmetric by switching the roles of a and b).
We extend M to the edge gadget by the 3-sets {he,ia , f e, f¯ e}, {he,ib , ge1, g¯e3}, {he,ja , ge2, g¯e2},
{he,jb , ge3, g¯e1}, and {αe1, αe2, αe3}. It remains to show that this does not lead to a blocking 3-set.
First, note that none of the agents gep, g¯
e
p, f
e, and f¯ e is contained in a blocking 3-set. Therefore,
the agents he,ib , h
e,j
a , and h
e,j
b are not part of a blocking 3-set. The only remaining possible
blocking 3-set is {aip, αe1, he,ia } for p ≤ r < i∗. However, aip prefers M over {αe1, he,ia }.
B.5.2 Proof of the Forward Direction
Lemma B.4. If G contains a multicolored independent set I, then there exists a stable matching.
Proof. Each vertex-selection gadget Ai selects a vertex from I ∩ V i. This matching is extended
as described in Lemmas B.1 and B.3. Due to Lemmas B.1 to B.3 we immediately get the
stability of the constructed matching.
B.5.3 Proof of the Backward Direction
Lemma B.5. If there exists a stable matching, then G contains a multicolored independent set.
Proof. By Lemma B.2, every vertex-selection gadget selects a vertex. By Lemma B.3, no two
selected vertices are adjacent. Thus, the selected vertices form a multicolored independent
set.
B.5.4 The parameter
It remains to show that the preferences of the constructed MDSR-Poset-instance can be
derived from a poset of bounded width.
The poset looks as follows. For each vertex-selection gadget Ai, there are six chains of the
poset. One chain contains all agents {aij : j ∈ [n]}, one the agents {bij : j ∈ [n]}, one the agents
{cij : j ∈ [n − 1]}, one the agents {c¯ij : j ∈ [n − 1]}, one the agents {dij : j ∈ [n + 1]}, and one
the agents {d¯ij : j ∈ [n+ 1]}. All of these six chains are ordered by j.
For each i 6= j ∈ [k], the agents from the edge gadgets for all edges from Ei,j are contained
in 15 posets, each one containing all agents of the form de,ia , one of the form d
e,i
b , and so on.
We fix an arbitrary order of the edges from Ei,j , and order the agents inside the chains by the
order of the edges in which edge gadget they belong.
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Finally, we add the agents from the cut-off gadgets to the master poset. We group the
agents from the cut-off gadgets into six chains, where again one chain contains the agents of
one form. The master poset orders the agents from one chain by the order the corresponding
cut-off gadgets have been added to the instance.
We arrive at the following observation.
Observation B.6. The preferences are derived from a poset of width at most O(k2).
We now have proven Theorem 4.7.
B.6 Proof of Theorem 4.8
Input: A set V of agents together with preference lists ≻v over Xv for a subset Xv ⊆(
V \{v}
d−1
)
for each v ∈ V .
Task: Decide whether a stable matching exists.
MDSRI
Input: An MDSRI instance, and a total order ≻ML of the agents (called master list)
such that for each agent, ≻v arises from ≻ML through the deletion of some
(d− 1)-sets.
Task: Decide whether there exists a stable matching.
MDSRI-ML
Input: A Stable Marriage with Ties and Incomplete Preferences instance,
where the preferences are derived from two master lists ≻m and ≻w (one for
the men, and one for the women), in which the women’s master list is strictly
ordered and the maximum length of a tie in the men’s master list is two.
Task: Decide whether there exists a perfect stable matching.
Perfect-SMTI-ML
For the rest of this section, we fix a Perfect-SMTI-ML instance I = (G,≻m,≻w), where
G is the acceptability graph (i.e., the graph where each agent is a vertex, and two agents are
connected by an edge if and only if they find each other mutually acceptable), and ≻m and ≻w
are the master list of men and women, respectively. We denote the set of men by U , and the
set of women by W . Let W = {w1, . . . , w|W |} such that wi ≻m wi+1 or wi ∼m wi+1 for all
i ∈ [|W | − 1] and let U = {m1, . . . ,m|U |} such that mi ≻w mi+1 for all i ∈ [|U | − 1].
The reduction adds an agent ai for each mi, and an agent bj for each wj. If (mi, wj) is an
acceptable pair, then we also add an agent ci,j, and the 3-set {ai, bj , ci,j} is acceptable. The
preferences of ai and bj correspond to those of mi and wj , i.e., ai prefers {bj , ci,j} over {bj′ , ci,j′}
if mi prefers wj over wj′ , and bj prefers {ai, ci,j} over {ai′ , ci′,j} if and only if wj prefers mi over
mi′ . If mi ties two women wj and wj+1, then this is modeled by a tie gadget. Finally, there is
a cut-off gadget, which ensures that any agent ai is matched in any stable matching.
Tie gadget. Given a man mi ∈ M who ties two women wj and wj+1, we construct a
tie gadget T ji as follows. This gadget models this tie, i.e., it allows mi to be matched to wj or
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ci,j+1
c′i,j
bj+1
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ci,j
d1i,j
d2i,j
d3i,jd
4
i,jd
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d6i,j d
7
i,j
d8i,j
Figure 3: The acceptable 3-sets of a tie gadget T ji . For example, the line around ai, ci,j+1, and
bj+1 indicates that the 3-set {ai, ci,j+1, bj+1} is acceptable.
wj+1. The idea is the following: There are two stable matchings inside the gadget, one leaving
ci,j unmatched while the other matches ci,j . The first one allows to match mi to wj via the
3-set {ai, bj , ci,j}, while the second allows to match mi to wj+1 via {ai, bj+1, ci,j+1} (note that
in this case ci,j prevents the 3-set {ai, bj , ci,j} from being blocking). In this case, the 3-set
{ai, bj , c′i,j} ensures if {ai, bj+1, ci,j+1} is not part of the matching, then the 3-set {ai, bj , c′i,j}
can be blocking to represent the possibly blocking pair (mi, wj).
We add nine agents c′i,j and d
1
i,j , . . . , d
8
i,j , together with the acceptable 3-sets {ai, ci,j , bj},
{ai, ci,j , bj+1}, {ai, c′i,j , bj+1}, {ci,j , d5i,j , d8i,j}, {d1i,j , d2i,j , d8i,j}, {d1i,j , d4i,j , d6i,j}, {d2i,j , d3i,j , d7i,j}, and
{d3i,j , d4i,j , d5i,j}. See Figure 3 for an example.
The preferences of any agent arise from the following preferences through the deletion of all 2-
sets which are not acceptable for an agent. {d1i,j , d2i,j} ≻ {d1i,j , d4i,j} ≻ {d2i,j , d3i,j} ≻ {d3i,j , d4i,j} ≻
{d1i,j , d6i,j} ≻ {d3i,j , d5i,j} ≻ {d4i,j , d5i,j} ≻ {d2i,j , d7i,j} ≻ {d3i,j , d7i,j} ≻ {d1i,j , d8i,j} ≻ {d2i,j , d8i,j} ≻
{d4i,j , d6i,j} ≻ {d5i,j , d8i,j} ≻ {d5i,j , ci,j} ≻ {d8i,j , ci,j} ≻ {ai, ci,j} ≻ {ai, ci,j+1} ≻ {ai, c′i,j} ≻
{bj , ci,j} ≻ {bj+1, ci,j+1} ≻ {bj , c′i,j}, which can be derived from the following strict order of
agents: d1i,j ≻ d2i,j ≻ · · · ≻ d8i,j ≻ ai ≻ bj ≻ bj+1 ≻ ci,j ≻ ci,j+1 ≻ c′i,j .
We now observe that the tie gadget indeed models ties, i.e., it contains a stable matching
which matches mi to wj and one which matches mi to wj+1. Furthermore, it is also possible to
match mi or wj and wj+1 better than wj or mi.
Observation B.7. Let T ji be a tie gadget. The matchingsM1 = {{ai, ci,j+1, bj+1}, {ci,j , d5i,j, d8i,j},
{d2i,j , d3i,j , d7i,j}, {d1i,j , d4i,j , d6i,j}} and M2 = {{ai, ci,j , bj}, {d1i,j , d2i,j , d8i,j}, {d3i,j , d4i,j , d5i,j}} are sta-
ble. In T ji − {ai} or T ji − {bj , bj+1}, also the matching M = {{ci,j , d5i,j , d8i,j}, {d2i,j , d3i,j , d7i,j},
{d1i,j , d4i,j , d6i,j}} is stable.
B.6.1 Cut-off gadget
A cut-off gadget has six agents x1, . . . , x6. The only acceptable 3-sets are {x1, x5, x6}, {x2, x4, x6},
and {x3, x4, x5}. See Figure 4 for an example.
The master list is {x2, x4} ≻ {x1, x5} ≻ {x1, x6} ≻ {x3, x4} ≻ {x3, x5} ≻ {x2, x6} ≻
{x4, x5} ≻ {x4, x6} ≻ {x5, x6}. Note that this list can be derived from x1 ≻ x2 ≻ x3 ≻ x4 ≻
x5 ≻ x6.
We now observe that a cut-off gadget does not admit a stable matching, implying that one
of the agents has to be matched outside the gadget. Thus, if we add the cut-off gadget for an
agent v, then this means that we add the agents x2, . . . , x6 and identify v with x1, ensuring
that any stable matching matches v.
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Figure 4: The acceptable 3-sets of a cut-off gadget.
Matching Blocking 3-set
{x1, x5, x6} {x2, x4, x6}
{x2, x4, x6} {x3, x4, x5}
{x3, x4, x5} {x1, x5, x6}
Table 3: The blocking 2-sets in the subinstance from Lemma A.2.
Lemma B.8. A cut-off gadget does not admit a stable matching.
Proof. Note that any acceptable 3-set contains two agents from {x4, x5, x6}. Thus, any matching
contains only one 3-set.
For each of the three possible matchings, we give a blocking 3-set in Table 3.
We observe that if the agent v is matched, then the cut-off gadget does not contain a blocking
3-set.
Observation B.9. The cut-off gadget without x1 admits a stable matching, namely {x3, x4, x5}.
B.6.2 The reduction
Our reduction is structured similarly to the NP-completeness proof of 3-Dimensional Stable
Marriage with Incomplete Cyclic Preferences by Biro´ and McDermid [4]. In both
reductions, there is one agent for each man and each woman. Each such agent is forced to be
matched in any stable matching by a gadget based on a small unsolvable instance. However,
modelling the ties in the preferences is a bit more complicated in our case, and is done by the
tie gadget described in Section 5.
We construct a 3-DSRI-ML instance I ′ with a strict master list from I as follows.
For each men mi, we add an agent ai, and for each women wj , we add an agent bj . For
each man mi, and each woman wj who is not tied with another woman in mi’ preference list,
we add an agent ci,j . For each man mi, and each tie wj ∼ wj+1 in mi’s preference list, we add
a tie gadget T ji (which is described in Section 5).
For each agent ai, we define a sublist Ai as follows. Process all woman wj adjacent to mi
by increasing j. If the woman is not tied with another woman adjacent to mi, then add the
2-set {ai, ci,j}, followed by {bj , ci,j}. Otherwise, wj is tied with wj+1 in the preference list of mi.
Then add the 2-sets {ai, ci,j} ≻ML {ai, ci,j+1} ≻ML {ai, c′i,j} ≻ML {bj , ci,j} ≻ML {bj , ci,j+1} ≻ML
{bj , c′i,j} to Ai (see Section 5).
For each man mi, we add a cut-off gadget Ii (described in Appendix B.6.1), where the
vertex x1 of the cut-off gadget is identified with ai.
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The master list looks as follows. First, we add for each tie gadget T ji (ordered by i|U | +
j) the 2-sets {d1i,j , d6i,j} ≻ML {d3i,j , d5i,j} ≻ML {d4i,j , d5i,j} ≻ML {d2i,j , d7i,j} ≻ML {d3i,j , d7i,j} ≻ML
{d1i,j , d8i,j} ≻ML {d2i,j , d8i,j} ≻ML {d4i,j , d6i,j} ≻ML {d5i,j , ci,j} ≻ML {d8i,j , ci,j}. This is followed by
the sublists A1, A2, . . . , A|U |. Then, all 2-sets containing agents from cut-off gadgets follow, in
a way such that the relative order between two 2-sets containing agents from the same cut-off
gadget coincides with the order given in Appendix B.6.1.
Observation B.10. The master list ≻ML is derived from a strict order.
Proof. The master list is derived from the following order. At the beginning are the agents dki,j
from the tie gadgets, in an arbitrary order satisfying dki,j ≻ dk
′
i,j if k < k
′. Then, the agents
ai follow, ordered increasingly by i. Then, the agents bi follow, ordered increasingly by i.
Afterwards, the agents ci,j come, ordered in such a way that ci,j is before ci′,j′ if and only if either
i < i′ or i = i′ and j < j′. The agents c′i,j are inserted directly after ci,j+1. Finally, the agents
from the cut-off gadgets Ii for 1 ≤ i ≤ n come, in the order specified in Appendix B.6.1.
B.6.3 Proof of the forward direction
Lemma B.11. If the Perfect-SMTI-ML instance I admits a perfect stable matching M ,
then the MDSRI-ML instance I ′ admits a stable matching.
Proof. We construct a stable matching M ′ as follows.
For each edge (mi, wj) ∈M , we add the 3-set {ai, bj , ci,j} to M ′. If wj is tied with another
woman wℓ, then we add the 3-sets {ci,ℓ, d5i,j , d8i,j}, {d2i,j , d3i,j , d7i,j}, and {d1i,j , d4i,j , d6i,j} if ℓ = j−1,
and the 3-sets {d1i,ℓ, d2i,ℓ, d8i,ℓ}, and {d3i,ℓ, d4i,ℓ, d5i,ℓ} if ℓ = j + 1.
For each tie gadget between mi, wj and wj+1 such that both (mi, wj) /∈M and (mi, wj+1) /∈
M hold, we add the 3-sets {ci,j , d5i,j , d8i,j}, {d2i,j , d3i,j , d7i,j}, and {d1i,j , d4i,j , d6i,j}.
For each cut-off gadget, we add the edge {x3, x4, x5} to M ′.
We claim that M ′ is a stable matching.
Since M is perfect, every agent ai is matched to a 2-set it prefers over any 2-set of agents
from its cut-off gadget. By Observation B.9, we get that no agent from Ii \ {ai} participates in
a blocking 3-set. For all tie gadgets T ji , Observation B.7 tells us that no blocking 3-set contains
only agents of the form dki,j . Any other acceptable 3-sets contains an agent ai as well as an agent
bj , and ai prefers such a 3-set over M(ai) = {wℓ, ci,ℓ} if and only if mi prefers wj over M(mi)
or if ℓ = j − 1. However, if ℓ = j − 1 and (mi, wj) /∈M , then we have {ci,ℓ, d5i,j , d8i,j} ∈M ′, and
thus ciℓ does not prefer {ai, bℓ} over M ′. The agent bj prefers this 3-set over M ′(bj) if and only
if wj prefers ai over M(wj). Thus, by the stability of M , no blocking 3-set contains an agent
ai, and therefore, no blocking 3-set exists.
Altogether, M ′ is stable.
B.6.4 Proof of the backward direction
Lemma B.12. If the MDSRI-ML instance I ′ admits a stable matchingM ′, then the Perfect-
SMTI-ML instance I admits a perfect stable matching.
Proof. LetM ′ be such a stable matching in I ′. By Lemma B.8, each agent ai has to be matched
to a 2-set outside its cut-off gadget. Any such 2-set involves an agent bj. Thus, this defines a
perfect matching M := {(mi, wj) : ∃v s.t. {ai, bj , v} ∈M ′}.
We claim thatM is stable. Assume thatM admits a blocking pair (mi, wj). If wj is not tied
with M(mi) by mi, then {ai, bj , ci,j} is a blocking 3-set (ai and bj prefer this 3-set as (mi, wj)
is blocking, and ci,j as it is the only acceptable 3-set for ci,j). If mi ties wj with a woman wℓ,
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then M cannot contain one of the edges (mi, wj) or (mi, wℓ) (as else (mi, wj) was not blocking).
Thus, M ′ does not contain the 3-set t :=
{
{ai, bj , ci,j} if ℓ = j − 1
{ai, bj , c′i,j} if ℓ = j + 1
. Since ci,j if ℓ = j − 1 or
c′i,j if ℓ = j + 1 is unmatched, and (mi, wj) is a blocking pair, we get that t is a blocking 3-set,
contradicting the stability of M ′.
The problem is clearly in NP, as we can check the stability of a matching in O(n3) time. The
reduction can clearly be performed in linear time, and its correctness is proven in Lemmas B.11
and B.12. Observation B.10 shows that the master list is strict.
C Missing Proofs of Section 4.4
C.1 MDSR-Poset Example
Example 4. Consider a MDSR-Poset instance I with the following preferences.
v1 : {v2, v3} ≻ {v3, v4} ≻ {v2, v5} ≻ {v2, v4} ≻ {v3, v5} ≻ {v4, v5},
v2 : {v1, v3} ≻ {v3, v4} ≻ {v1, v5} ≻ {v1, v4} ≻ {v3, v5} ≻ {v4, v5},
v3 : {v1, v2} ≻ {v1, v4} ≻ {v2, v5} ≻ {v2, v4} ≻ {v1, v5} ≻ {v4, v5},
v4 : {v1, v5} ≻ {v1, v2} ≻ {v2, v5} ≻ {v1, v3} ≻ {v3, v5} ≻ {v2, v3},
v5 : {v2, v3} ≻ {v3, v4} ≻ {v1, v2} ≻ {v2, v4} ≻ {v1, v3} ≻ {v1, v4}.
After the deletion of v5, the preferences are
v1 : {v2, v3} ≻ {v3, v4} ≻ {v2, v4},
v2 : {v1, v3} ≻ {v3, v4} ≻ {v1, v4},
v3 : {v1, v2} ≻ {v1, v4} ≻ {v2, v4},
v4 : {v1, v2} ≻ {v1, v3} ≻ {v2, v3}.
which is derived from v1 ≻ v2 ≻ v3 ≻ v4. Hence, it holds that λ(I) = 1.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 4.9
In this section, we show that 3-DSR parameterized by λ(I) is W[1]-hard. We give a parame-
terized reduction from Multicolored Clique, which is known to be W[1]-complete [12].
Input: A k-partite graph G = (V 1 ∪˙ V 2 ∪˙ · · · ∪˙ V k, E).
Task: Decide whether G contains a clique C with C ∩ V i 6= ∅ for all i ∈ [k].
Multicolored Clique
The sets V 1, . . . , V k are called color classes. By adding vertices and edges, we may assume
without loss of generality that there exists some n′ ∈ N such that |V i| = 3n′ + 1 for all i ∈ [k],
and that there exists some m′ ∈ N such that |E(V i, V j)| = 3m′ + 1 for all i, j ∈ [k]. For each
color class V i, we fix an arbitrary order of the vertices, i.e., V i = {vi1, vi2, . . . , vi3n′+1}. For a
vertex v ∈ V (G), we denote by δ(v) the set of all edges incident to v.
When describing the reduction, we only describe the beginning of the preferences of an
agent. The remaining acceptable 2-sets can be added in an arbitrary way obeying the strict
master list (extended to the λ(I) agents not contained in this list).
We begin by describing the gadgets used in the reduction.
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C.2.1 Cut-off gadget
In Section 3, we have seen
If we add a cut-off gadget for an agent v and a 2-set {x, y} (with v /∈ {x, y}), then we add
six agents bv, cv, dv , ev , f v, and gv . The preferences of bv, cv , dv, ev, f v begin with the same
preferences as b, c, d, e, and f in Section 3 (where a is identified with v), i.e., the start of the
preferences is derived from
{v, bv} ≻ {v, cv} ≻ {v, dv} ≻ {v, f v} ≻ {bv, ev} ≻ {cv, dv} ≻ {v, ev} ≻ {bv, f v}
≻ {cv, ev} ≻ {bv, dv} ≻ {dv , ev} ≻ {bv , cv} ≻ {cv , f v} ≻ {dv , f v} ≻ {ev , f v}
≻ {bv, gv} ≻ {cv, gv} ≻ {dv , gv} ≻ {ev , gv} ≻ {f v, gv}.
The preferences of gv first contain all 2-sets of agents from {bv, cv , dv, ev , f v}, and then all other
2-sets of agents in an arbitrary order.
The preferences of v look as follows.
v : old preferences until {x, y}
≻ {bv, ev} ≻ {cv , dv} ≻ {bv , f v} ≻ {cv , ev} ≻ {bv, dv}
≻ {dv, ev} ≻ {bv, cv} ≻ {cv , f v} ≻ {dv , f v} ≻ {ev , f v}
≻ {bv, gv} ≻ {cv, gv} ≻ {dv , gv} ≻ {ev , gv} ≻ {f v, gv}
≻ old preferences after {x, y}.
We now formally show that the cut-off gadget works as desired, i.e., forces v to be matched
to a 2-set it does not prefer over {x, y}.
Lemma C.1. In any stable matching M , agent v does not prefer {x, y} over M(v).
Proof. Let M be a stable matching. Note that the agents bv, cv , dv, ev , and f v can only be
matched to v or agents from bv, cv, dv , ev , f v, gv , as the first 2-sets of their preferences and the
preferences of gv only contain these agents.
Note that the subinstance on the agents v and bv, cv , dv , ev, f v is the instance from Lemma A.2
not admitting a stable matching.
Therefore, in any stable matching, v is not matched to agents from bv, cv , dv , ev, f v, gv , which
can only be achieved if v does not prefer {x, y} over M(v).
Lemma C.2. Any matching M in which v does not prefer {x, y} over M(v) can be extended
to bv, cv , dv, ev , f v, gv without introducing a new blocking 3-set.
Proof. We extend M by {bv , cv, dv} and {ev , f v, gv}. Since v does not prefer {x, y} over M(v),
this agent is not contained in any new blocking 3-set.
The agents bv, cv, dv , ev, f v, and gv can thus only be contained in a blocking 3-set if this
3-set consists of three of these agents.
However, bv is matched to its most preferred 2-set not containing v and thus is not part of
a blocking 3-set. Agent cv only prefers only {bv , f v} over {bv, dv}; however since bv is not part
of a blocking 3-set, cv is also not part of a blocking 3-set. All 2-sets dv prefers over {bv , cv}
contain v, bv, or cv, and thus, dv is not part of a blocking 3-set. Thus, no agent from bv, cv,
and dv is blocking, and thus, no new blocking 2-sets are introduced.
If we add a cut-off gadget for an agent v and a 2-set {x, y}, then we write its preference
list just until {x, y}, and then write CO to represent an arbitrary order obeying the master
list of the remaining 2-sets (the exact order of these 2-sets is irrelevant for the stability of the
matching).
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C.2.2 Vertex-selection gadget
For each color class Vi, we add a vertex selection gadget Ai. This vertex-selection gadget
contains an agent for each vertex vpi with p ∈ [3n′ + 1]; we identify the agent and the vertex
and call both vpi . Furthermore, the vertex-selection gadget contains two agents si and s
′
i. The
vertex-selection gadget also contains a cut-off gadget for each of the agents si, s
′
i, and v
3n′+1
i .
The preferences of an agent vpi ∈ Vi start with {si, s′i} ≻
({v1i } × {vqi : q ∈ [3n′ + 1]}) ≻({v2i } × {vqi : q ∈ [3n′ + 1]}) ≻ . . . ({v3n′+1i } × {vqi : q ∈ [3n′ + 1]}). These preferences need to
be extended to the agents not contained in the vertex-selection gadget. This extension is done
by adding all 2-sets containing an agent vpj with j < i in front of the list, and adding all other
2-sets, in an arbitrary way obeying the master list described in Lemma C.3.
For the agent v3n
′+1
i , a cut-off gadget follows; for the other agents, the preferences are
extended in an arbitrary strict way.
The preferences of si and s
′
i are as follows (the agents xi,j, x
′
i,j, ae, and be will be introduced
in the incidence-checking gadgets in Appendix C.2.3).
si : {s′i, v1i } ≻ ({ae, be} × {xi,j})j 6=i,e∈E(Vi,Vj)∩δ(v1i ) ≻ {s
′
i, v2}
≻ ({ae, be} × {xi,j})j 6=i,e∈E(Vi,Vj)∩δ(v2i ) ≻ (s
′
i, v3) ≻ · · · ≻ {s′i, v3n′+1} ≻ CO
s′i : {si, v3n′+1} ≻ ({ae, be} × {xi,j})j 6=i,e∈E(Vi,Vj)∩δ(v3n′+1i ) ≻ {si, v3n′}
≻ ({ae, be} × {xi,j})j 6=i,e∈E(Vi,Vj)∩δ(v3n′i ) ≻ {si, v3n′−1 ≻ · · · ≻ {si, v1} ≻ CO
C.2.3 Incidence-checking gadget
For each 2-set of color classes Vi and Vj with i < j, we add an incidence-checking gadget Bi,j.
Let E(Vi, Vj) = {e1, . . . , e3m′+1}. For each edge eℓ ∈ E(Vi, Vj), it contains two agents aℓ and bℓ.
Furthermore, there are 3m′ agents cℓ. The gadget also contains seven agents xi,j, x
′
i,j, xj,i, x
′
j,i,
zi,j, z
′
i,j and z
′′
i,j, which do not have the master preferences, and an cut-off gadget for z
′
i,j. Let
X := {xi,j, x′i,j , xj,i, x′j,i}.
The preferences of aℓ (resp. bℓ) are as follows (deleting all 2-sets containing aℓ (resp. bℓ)
and ignoring agents outside the incidence-checking gadget; the preferences can be extended in
an arbitrary way complying with the master list). Any set of 2-sets in the preferences shall be
replaced by an arbitrary order of the elements in this set which is consistent with the master
list.
({si, s′i, sj , s′j} ×X) ≻
(
X
2
)
≻ (X × {aq : q ∈ [3m′ + 1]}) ≻ (X × {bq : q ∈ [3m′ + 1]})
≻ ({aq, bq : q ∈ [ℓ− 1]} × {zi,j}) ≻
({aq, bq, cq : q ∈ [ℓ]}
2
)
≻ ({aq, bq : q ∈ [ℓ, 3m′ + 1]} × {zi,j})
Similarly as for the agents vpi , we presented only the relevant part of the preferences of aℓ
and bℓ. These preferences need to be extended outside the incidence-checking gadget by adding
all 2-sets involving agents from vertex-selection gadgets or incidence-checking gadgets Bi′,j′ with
i′ < i or i′ = i and j′ < j at the beginning of the preferences, and all other 2-sets in an arbitrary
order obeying the master list described in Lemma C.3.
The preferences of zi,j start as follows.
({aℓ} × {bℓ}) ≻ {z′i,j , z′′i,j}.
The preferences of z′i,j start as follows. {zi,j , z′′i,j} ≻ CO.
The preferences of z′′i,j start with the 2-set {zi,j , z′i,j}.
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To describe the preferences of xi,j and xi,j , we define sublists Cℓ and
←−
C ℓ. The sublist Cℓ
contains the 2-sets {x′i,j, ae} for all e ∈ E(Vi, Vj) ∩ δ(vℓi ), ordered by increasing index of the
endpoint of e contained in Vj . The sublist
←−
C ℓ contains the 2-sets {xi,j , ae} for e ∈ E(Vi, Vj) ∩
δ(vℓi ), but is ordered by decreasing index of the endpoint of e contained in Vj . The preferences
of xi,j and x
′
i,j look as follows.
xi,j : {si, v3n′+1i } ≻ C3n′+1 ≻ {si, v3n
′
i } ≻ C3n′ ≻ · · · ≻ {si, v1i } ≻ C1 ≻ rest in arbitrary order.
x′i,j : {s′i, v1i } ≻
←−
C 1 ≻ {s′i, v2i } ≻
←−
C 2 ≻ · · · ≻ {s′i, v3n
′+1
i } ≻
←−
C 3n′+1 ≻ rest in arbitrary order.
For the vertices xj,i and x
′
j,i, the preferences are identical to those of xi,j and x
′
i,j, except that
in each 2-set containing an agent aℓ, this agent is replaced by bℓ, and in each 2-set containing
an agent vℓi , this agent is replaced by v
ℓ
j.
C.2.4 The reduction
Given an instance (G, k) of Multicolored Clique, we design an MDSR-instance I ′ as fol-
lows.
The instance contains k vertex-selection gadgets Ai, one for each color class Vi. Between
each pair {Ai, Aj} of vertex-selection gadgets, there is an incidence-checking gadget Bi,j.
We now show that our parameter λ is indeed small for the constructed instance I ′.
Lemma C.3. We have λ(I ′) = O(k2).
Proof. We delete the agents si, xi,j, xi,j′, zi,j, z
′
i,j, z
′′
i,j for i 6= j ∈ [k], and all agents contained
in cut-off gadgets. Note that there are O(k2) such agents.
It remains to show that the remaining preferences are derived from a strict master list. The
master list looks as follows. It starts with all agents vpi , ordered in such a way that agent v
p
i
is before agent vp
′
i′ if and only if either i < i
′ or i = i′ and p < p′. Then, the agents from the
edge-selection gadgets follow. We add all agents from one edge-selection gadget at once, and
the edge-selection gadgets Bi,j, ordered in such a way that Bi,j is before Bi′,j′ if and only if
either i < i′ or i = i′ and j < j′. The agents inside an edge-selection gadget are ordered as
follows. a1 ≻ b1 ≻ c1 ≻ a2 ≻ b2 ≻ c2 ≻ · · · ≻ c3m′ ≻ a3m′+1 ≻ b3m′+1.
C.2.5 Proof of the forward direction
We prove that if G contains a clique of size k, then I ′ admits a stable matching. So let
{vp11 , . . . , vpkk } be a multicolored clique. We construct a stable matching M as follows.
For the vertex-selection gadget Ai, we add the 3-set {vpii , si, s′i}. All other vertex agents vqi
are matched to each other, according to their index q (i.e., matching the three agents with
lowest q together, then the next three agents, and so on). For each edge eα = {vpii , vpjj } with
i < j from the clique, we add {xi,j, x′i,j , aα} and {xj,i, x′j,i, bα} to M . Furthermore, we add the
edges {aℓ, bℓ, cℓ} for ℓ < α, and {aℓ, bℓ, cℓ−1} for ℓ > α. The agents from the cut-off gadgets are
matched as described in Lemma C.2. We call the resulting matching M .
It remains to show that M is stable. In order to do so, we will show that no agent is part
of a blocking 3-set.
Lemma C.4. No agent s′i is part of a blocking 3-set.
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Proof. All 2-sets which s′i ranks better than {si, vpii } are of the form {si, vℓi} for ℓ > pi,
or {x′i,j , aℓ}, or {x′i,j, bℓ} for an edge eℓ ∈ E(Vi, Vj) whose endpoint in Vi is vqi with q > r.
For the 2-sets {si, vℓi}, note that si does not prefer {s′i, vℓi} over {s′i, vpii }.
For the 2-sets {x′i,j, aℓ} and {x′i,j, bℓ}, note that x′i,j does not prefer {aℓ, s′i} or {bℓ, s′i} over
{x′i,j , ae∗} for the edge e∗ = {vpii , vpjj } as q > r.
Thus, s′i is not part of a blocking 3-set.
Lemma C.5. No vertex si is part of a blocking 3-set.
Proof. The proof works in complete analogy to the proof of Lemma C.4.
Lemma C.6. No agent xi,j or x
′
i,j is part of a blocking 3-set.
Proof. A blocking 3-set cannot contain si, s
′
i, sj, or s
′
j by Lemmas C.4 and C.5.
Thus, it is of the form {xi,j , x′i,j , ae} or {xi,j, x′i,j , be} for some edge e ∈ E(Vi, Vj). Since xi,j
prefers {x′i,j , ae} over {x′i,j, a{vpii ,vpjj }}, the agent x
′
i,j does not prefer {xi,j , ae} over {xi,j , a{vpii ,vpjj }}.
Lemma C.7. For each i ≤ k, no vertex from Vi is part of a blocking 3-set.
Proof. We prove the statement by induction. For i = 0 there is nothing to show.
Fix i ∈ [k]. Note that all agents vpjj are matched to their first choice, and thus not part of a
blocking 2-set. By Lemmas C.4 and C.5, no agent sj or s
′
j is involved in a blocking 3-set. Thus,
by induction over p, one easily sees that all 2-sets, which vpi prefers over the 2-set it is matched
to in M , contain an agent about which we already know that it is not contained in a blocking
3-set, implying that also vpi is not contained in a blocking 3-set.
Thus, no agent of Vi is part of a blocking 3-set.
Lemma C.8. No agent ae, be, or cℓ is part of a blocking 3-set.
Proof. The argument is basically the same as in the proof of Lemma C.7.
We do an induction over the incidence-checking gadgets, note that the agents matched to
{xi,j , x′i,j} cannot be contained in a blocking 3-set, and then note that for every agent, all 2-sets
which it prefers over the 2-set it is matched to in M contain an agent which is not contained in
a blocking 3-set (using Lemma C.6 for some of these 2-sets).
Lemma C.9. Matching M is stable.
Proof. By Lemmas C.4 to C.8, no agent outside a cut-off gadget is contained in a blocking 3-set.
Thus, by Lemma C.2, there is no blocking 3-set.
C.2.6 Proof of the backward direction
We prove that if I ′ admits a stable matching, then G contains a clique of size k. Let M be a
stable matching.
Lemma C.10. Any stable matching M contains a 3-set {si, s′i, vpi } for some p ∈ [3n′ +1], and
all other agents vqi are matched to each other for q 6= p.
Proof. Consider a stable matching M . We prove the statement by induction over i. Thus, we
know that no agent from a former gadget is matched to the current gadget. By the preferences,
the agents vpi prefer most to be matched to other agents of the form v
q
i , or to {si, s′i}. Due
to the cut-off gadget for v3n
′+1
i , Lemma C.1 implies that exactly one agent v
p
i is matched to
{s, s′}.
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We say that a matching selects a vertex vpi if it contains the 3-set {si, s′i, vpi }.
Lemma C.11. A stable matching on Ai ∪ Aj cannot be extended to the incidence-checking
gadget Bi,j without introducing a blocking 3-set if G does not contains an edge between the two
vertices selected by the vertex-selection gadgets Ai and Aj.
Proof. Let M be a stable matching on the vertex-selection gadgets. By Lemma C.10, the
vertex-selection gadgets Ai and Aj select a vertex, say v
p
i and v
q
j .
Now assume that the edge {vpi , vqj} is not contained in G. We need to show that any extension
of M contains a blocking 3-set. So fix such an extension M ′, and assume for a contradiction
that M ′ is stable.
Note that the cut-off gadgets for xi,j and x
′
i,j and the observation that the agent si from the
vertex-selection gadget is matched to the 2-set {s′i, vpi } implies that xi,j and x′i,j are matched to
an agent ar, i.e., {xi,j , x′i,j , ar} ∈M ′. Similarly, xj,i and x′j,i are matched to an agent bs.
Let er = {vrii , vrjj }. If ri < p, then {eri , si, xi,j} is a blocking 3-set. If ri > p, then
{eri , s′i, x′i,j} is a blocking 3-set. Thus, vpi is an endpoint of er. By symmetric arguments, we
get that vqj is an endpoint of es.
Since {vpi , vqj} /∈ E(Vi, Vj), it follows that s 6= r.
First assume r < s. By the cut-off gadget for z′i,j , the matching M
′ contains the 3-set
{zi,j , z′i,j , z′′i,j}. The stability of M ′ implies that any stable matching contains {aℓ, bℓ, cℓ} for
ℓ < r (by induction over ℓ, all 2-sets preferred over this 3-set contain an agent which is already
matched). However, the 3-set t = {zi,j , br, ar+1} is blocking, as zi,j prefers this 3-set over
M ′(zi,j) = {z′i,j , z′′i,j}, every 2-set the agent br or ar+1 prefers over t contains an agent from
A := {si, s′i, sj , s′j, xi,j , x′i,j, xj,i, x′j,i} ∪ {aq, bq, cq : q ∈ [r]}, but all agents from A are matched
neither to ar+1 nor br.
If s < r, then symmetric arguments show {zi,j , as, bs+1} is a blocking 3-set for M ′.
Lemma C.12. If I ′ admits a stable matching, then G admits a clique of size k.
Proof. The vertices selected by the vertex-selection gadgets form a clique, which follows directly
from Lemma C.11.
Theorem 4.9 now directly follows from Lemmas C.9, C.12, and C.3.
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